We study the transmission of fiscal shocks in the labor market. We employ a structural VAR and base identification on the restrictions that shocks to government consumption, investment, and employment must raise output and deficits. These restrictions hold in both prototype Real Business Cycle (RBC) and New Keynesian models. Shocks to government consumption and investment increase real wages and employment contemporaneously, both at state level and in the aggregate. The dynamics in response to employment shocks are mixed: Increases in government employment raise the real wage and total employment in the aggregate. However, in one third of the states they reduce total employment. Copyright � (2009) by the Economics Department of the University of Pennsylvania and the Osaka University Institute of Social and Economic Research Association.

A two-country model with monopolistic competition and price stickiness is employed to investigate the implications for macroeconomic stability and the welfare properties of three international policy arrangements: (a) cooperative, (b) non-cooperative and (c) monetary union. I characterize the conditions under which there is scope for policy cooperation and quantify the costs of non cooperation and monetary union. The non-cooperative equilibrium may be suboptimal because of beggar-thy-neighbor and beggar-thyself effects, while monetary union may be suboptimal because of the sluggishness of relative prices. Both the costs of policy competition and of a monetary union are sensitive to the values assumed for the intertemporal and international demand elasticity and the degree of openness of the economy. Independently of the calibration scenario adopted, the ECB has little to gain by coordinating with the Fed.JEL Classification: E52; F41; F42 Keyword(s): International policy arrangements; terms of trade; openness; international demand elastcity; intertemporal demand elasticity; optimal monetary policy * I would like to thank Gianluca Benigno, Fabio Canova, Ed Nelson, Morten Ravn, Tommaso Monacelli and seminar participants at several universities for useful comments. I owe special thanks to Jordi Gali for his invaluable advice.

We study the effect of regional expenditure and revenue shocks on price differentials for 47 US states and 9 EU countries. We identify shocks using sign restrictions on the dynamics of deficits and output and construct two estimates for structural price differentials dynamics which optimally weight the information contained in the data for all units. Fiscal shocks explain between 14 and 23 percent of the variability of price differentials both in the US and in the EU. On average, expansionary fiscal disturbances produce positive price differential responses while distortionary balance budget shocks produce negative price differential responses. In a number of units, price differential responses to expansionary fiscal shocks are negative. Spillovers and labor supply effects partially explain this pattern while geographical, political, and economic indicators do not. JEL classification numbers: E3, E5, H7

We examine the dynamics of US output and inflation using a structural time varying coefficient VAR. We show that there are changes in the volatility of both variables and in the persistence of inflation. Technology shocks explain changes in output volatility, while a combination of technology, demand and monetary shocks explain variations in the persistence and volatility of inflation. We detect changes over time in the transmission of technology shocks and in the variance of technology and of monetary policy shocks. Hours and labor productivity always increase in response to technology shocks. JEL classification: C11, E12, E32, E62

Structural VARs indicate that for many OECD countries labor force participation, employment, and the unemployment rate significantly increase following increases in government expenditures under a variety of specifications and identification schemes. Fiscal expansions also tend to increase real wages. Existing models have difficulties in generating such responses. We show that the empirical regularities can be reproduced with two additions into a standard New Keynesian model with matching frictions: (a) a labor force participation choice and (b) workers' heterogeneity.

We examine the macroeconomic effects of bidding for the Olympic Games using panel data for 188 countries during the period 1950–2009. Our findings confirm that economies react to news shocks: investment, consumption, and output significantly increase 9 to 7 years before the actual event in bidding countries. Hosting countries also experience significant increases in investment, consumption, and output 5 to 2 years before the hosting of the Games. Mapping the Olympics into a macroeconomic model, we show that we can match our empirical findings if we assume that an Olympic bid represents news about increases in government investment.

Article available under the terms of the CC-BY-NC-ND licence (https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/4.0/) eprints@whiterose.ac.uk https://eprints.whiterose.ac.uk/ Reuse Unless indicated otherwise, fulltext items are protected by copyright with all rights reserved. The copyright exception in section 29 of the Copyright, Designs and Patents Act 1988 allows the making of a single copy solely for the purpose of non-commercial research or private study within the limits of fair dealing. The publisher or other rights-holder may allow further reproduction and re-use of this version -refer to the White Rose Research Online record for this item. Where records identify the publisher as the copyright holder, users can verify any specific terms of use on the publisher's website. TakedownIf you consider content in White Rose Research Online to be in breach of UK law, please notify us by emailing eprints@whiterose.ac.uk including the URL of the record and the reason for the withdrawal request. Fiscal Consolidation with Tax Evasion and CorruptionEvi Pappa a,1, * , Rana Sajedi a,2 , Eugenia Vella a,3 a European University Institute, Florence, Italy, 50133 AbstractCross-country evidence highlights the importance of tax evasion and corruption in determining the size of fiscal multipliers. We introduce these two features in a New Keynesian model and revisit the effects of fiscal consolidations. VAR evidence for Italy suggests that spending cuts reduce tax evasion, while tax hikes increase it. In the model, spending cuts induce a reallocation of production towards the formal sector, thus reducing tax evasion.Tax hikes increase the incentives to produce in the less productive shadow sector, implying higher output and unemployment losses. Corruption further amplifies these losses by requiring larger hikes in taxes to reduce debt. We use the model to assess the recent fiscal consolidation plans in Greece, Italy, Portugal and Spain. Our results corroborate the evidence of increasing levels of tax evasion during these consolidations and point to significant output and welfare losses, which could be reduced substantially by combating tax evasion and corruption.

We investigate the theoretical conditions for effectiveness of government consumption expenditure expansions using US, Euro area and UK data. Fiscal expansions taking place when monetary policy is accommodative lead to large output multipliers in normal times. The 2009-2010 packages need not produce significant output multipliers, may have moderate debt effects, and only generate temporary inflation. Expenditure expansions accompanied by deficit/debt consolidations schemes may lead to short run output gains but their success depends on how monetary policy and expectations behave. Trade openness and the cyclicality of the labor wedge explain cross-country differences in the magnitude of the multipliers.JEL classification: C32, E62, E63.