The increasing power in-feed of Non-Synchronous Renewable Energy Sources (NS-RES) in the grid has raised concerns about the frequency stability. The volatile RES power output and absence of inertia in many types of NS-RES affect the balance between power consumption and production. Therefore, the dynamics of the power grid frequency become more complex. Extreme grid frequency deviations and fast variations can lead to partitioning and load shedding in the case of under-frequency. In the case of over-frequency, it can lead to overloading, voltage collapse and blackouts. The Rate of Change of Frequency (RoCoF) reflects an aspect of the stability status of the grid and therefore its analysis with regard to Non-Synchronous Instant Penetration (NSIP) is of great importance. In this work, two months of high-resolution frequency synchrophasor measurements during 18 January 2018-18 March 2018 recorded in Austria were analyzed to investigate the impact of NS-RES on the frequency. The correlation of RoCoF with the NSIP in Austria and Germany and with the frequency deviation were examined. It was observed that with a maximum NSIP share up to 74% of the total power generation in these two countries, there was no critical increase of RoCoF or abnormal frequency deviation in the power grid.

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Reliable and efficient energy supply is based not only on local control but also on remote sensor data and measurements, making communication one of the important components. The increasing threat of possible attacks is the motivation behind the main purpose of the FUSE testbed-an experimental microgrid for smart grid research-to conduct experiments on smart grid security, grid optimization, stabilization and islanding. This work, after providing an insight of the current state of the art concerning research on microgrids, describes the FUSE experimental facility as well as first experiments including partial measurement equipment installation and data collection and analysis. IntroductionThe current electricity infrastructure is evolving. Decentralized power generation demands more sophisticated control methods, Information and Communication Technology (ICT) components increase the risk for cyber-attacks and classical hierarchical top-down structures tend to be substituted by cell-based architectures, based on microgrids. A microgrid consists of several distributed generators as well as loads, storages and information and communication technology for monitoring and control operations. Through the Point of Common Coupling (PCC) it can connect to (grid connected, parallel mode) and disconnect from (islanding, autonomous operation) the main grid [7]. The ability of a microgrid to separate itself from the main grid and operate autonomously is very useful in case of faults and disturbances in the main grid.In decentralized approaches system-parts, e.g. generators, loads, storages, microgrids and grid controllers need to communicate with each other and interact with each other. The next generation grid is being formed; the smart grid. Major challenges in ensuring a reliable and efficient energy supply include, but are not limited to: the growing complexity of the grid due to the increasing number of renewable and distributed energy sources, the necessary energy saving and demand response strategies to optimize the energy flow, as well as the various components, protocols and sensors involved in the data transfer, protection and control actions.

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