No abstract

A growing stream of research is investigating how choices people make for themselves are different from choices people make for others. In this paper, I propose that these choices vary according to regulatory focus, such that people who make choices for themselves are prevention focused, whereas people who make choices for others are promotion focused. Drawing on regulatory focus theory, in particular work on errors of omission and commission, I hypothesize that people who make choices for others experience a reversal of the choice overload effect. In 6 studies, including a field study, I found that people who make choices for themselves are less satisfied after selecting among many options compared to few options, yet, people who make choices for others are more satisfied after selecting among many options compared to few options. Implications and suggestions for other differences in self-other decision making are discussed.

Creativity is a highly sought-after skill. Prescriptive advice for inspiring creativity abounds in the form of metaphors: People are encouraged to "think outside the box", to consider a problem "on one hand, then on the other hand", and to "put two and two together" to achieve creative breakthroughs. These metaphors suggest a connection between concrete bodily experiences and creative cognition. Inspired by recent advances in the understanding of body-mind linkages in the research on embodied cognition, we explored whether enacting metaphors for creativity enhances creative problem solving. Our findings from five studies revealed that both physical and psychological embodiment of metaphors for creativity promoted convergent thinking and divergent thinking (i.e., fluency, flexibility, or originality) in problem solving. Going beyond prior research, which focused primarily on the kind of embodiment that primes preexisting knowledge, we provide the first evidence that embodiment can also activate cognitive processes that facilitate the generation of new ideas and connections.

Through a large‐scale field study of 166,215 online restaurant reviews, we found evidence of a distance boosting effect, whereby experiencing spatial distance (i.e., authoring a review about a geographically distant restaurant, rather than proximate one) and temporal distance (i.e., authoring a review after a lengthy delay, rather than immediately) jointly affect review positivity by amplifying consumers' high‐level construals. Although past research has explored the relationship between psychological distance, construal and consumer evaluation, the effects of various dimensions of distance have only been considered in isolation. Our research contributes to past work by testing the effects of experiencing two dimensions of psychological distance simultaneously on construal and consumer evaluations. Moreover, because our data contain naturalistic observations, our research includes a wide range of temporal and spatial distances. We found that the effect of one distance increases the effect of the other. Metaphorically speaking, the effect of one distance is boosted by another.

Although extant research suggests maximizing is related to objectively positive outcomes (e.g., job offers), I propose maximizing may be simultaneously and positively related to objectively negative outcomes (e.g., job rejections). Specifically, I argue maximizers bear more instances of positive and negative outcomes than satisficers, and that in spite of their positive outcomes-yet because of their negative outcomesmaximizers are less happy than satisficers. In Study 1, participants took the alternate uses test; as expected, maximizing was related to seeking alternatives, yet, maximizing was also related to seeking low-quality alternatives. Moreover, the number of lowquality alternatives partially mediated the relationship between maximizing and negative affect. In Study 2, the impact of maximizing on experiencing negative affect was further assessed by examining whether maximizing is related to seeking and choosing low-quality alternatives. Participants played the Iowa Gambling Task; it was found maximizing was related to alternating among decks, and in particular, sampling bad decks; ultimately, maximizing was related to winning less money, and experiencing more negative affect. Finally, in Study 3, participants responded to questionnaires about positive and negative life outcomes; it was found that maximizing was simultaneously related to experiencing more positive and more negative outcomes, and that negative outcomes predicted happiness to a greater degree than positive outcomes. These findings suggest an irony of maximizing: It produces both positive and negative outcomes, contributing to literature explaining why maximizers are less happy than satisficers, and ultimately whether happiness is a matter of choice.

Four studies investigate whether decisions for others produce more creative solutions than do decisions for the self and if construal level explains this relation. In Study 1, participants carried out a structured imagination task by drawing an alien for a story that they would write, or alternatively for a story that someone else would write. As expected, drawing an alien for someone else produced a more creative alien. In Studies 2a and 2b, construal level (i.e., psychological distance) was independently manipulated. Participants generated more creative ideas on behalf of distant others than on behalf of either close others or themselves. Finally, in Study 3, a classic insight problem was investigated. Participants deciding for others were more likely to solve the problem; furthermore, this result was mediated by psychological distance. These findings demonstrate that people are more creative for others than for themselves and shed light on differences in self-other decision making.

Groups with a strong sense of collective efficacy set more challenging goals, persist in the face of difficulty, and are ultimately more likely to succeed than groups who do not share this belief. Given the many advantages that may accrue to groups who are confident, it would be logical to advise groups to build a high level of collective efficacy as early as possible. However, we draw on Whyte's (1998) theory of collective efficacy and groupthink, to predict that when confidence emerges at a high level toward the beginning of a group's existence, group members may be less likely to engage in process conflict; a form of conflict that may be beneficial in the early phase of a group project. We found support for this prediction in two longitudinal studies of classroom project teams. Groups with a strong sense of collective efficacy set more challenging goals, persist in the face of difficulty, and are ultimately more likely to succeed than groups who do not share this belief.Given the many advantages that may accrue to groups who are confident, it would be logical to advise groups to build a high level of collective efficacy as early as possible. However, we draw on Whyte's (1998) theory of collective efficacy and groupthink, to predict that when confidence emerges at a high level toward the beginning of a group's existence, group members may be less likely to engage in process conflict; a form of conflict that may be beneficial in the early phase of a group project. We found support for this prediction in two longitudinal studies of classroom project teams.

In the current article the authors examined the impact of specific emotions on moral hypocrisy, the tendency among people to judge others more severely than they judge themselves. In two studies, they found that (a) anger increased moral hypocrisy, (b) guilt eliminated moral hypocrisy, and (c) envy reversed moral hypocrisy. In particular, these findings were observed in two domains. In Study 1, participants responded to moral dilemmas describing unethical behavior and rated how acceptable it would be if others engaged in the unethical behavior, or alternatively, if they themselves engaged in the unethical behavior. In Study 2, participants were asked how much they would like to donate to research on cancer, or alternatively, how much they think others should donate. The results demonstrate that specific emotions influence moral decision making, even when real money is at stake, and that emotions of the same valence have opposing effects on moral judgment.