Abstract. In this paper, we describe a new ID-based authenticated key agreement protocol that makes use of bilinear pairings. We then discuss the security properties of our scheme, including known-key security, perfect forward secrecy and no key control. lt is also able to withstand both passive and active attacks. An important advantage of our scheme is that it preserves the perfect forward secrecy even though the long-term secret key of a trusted key generation center is compromised. We also show that it is more efficient than Chen and Kudla's protocol with same security properties as ours. lntroductionKey agreement is one of the fundamental problems considered in cryptography. The best-known protocol for key agreement is the Diffie-Hellman protocol, which allows two parties to establish a shared secret by exchanging messages over an open channel without the need for any prior communication. However, the basic Diffie-Hellman protocol is susceptible to a man-in-the-middle attack because it does not authenticate the communicating parties.Many solutions to this vulnerability in the Diffie-Hellman scheme have been developed over the years; recently, the identity-based (ID-based) approach has been the subject of much interest. In ID-based schemes, a public key is calculated directly from the user's identity rather than being extracted from a certificate that is issued by a trusted third-party. Such schemes can potentially provide the benefits of public key cryptography without the need for certificates and their attendant public key infrastructure.One of the first feasible solutions for ID-based encryption was Boneh and Franklin's scheme [3], which is based on pairings on elliptic curves. Other feasible ID-based key agreements based on the pairing technique were then developed; in particular, Smart[8] proposed an ID-based authenticated key agreement protocol based on a combination of the ideas from [1] and (2].All ID-based key agreement protocols require a Key Generation Center (KGC) that is relied upon to create and deliver private keys to entities and to not abuse its knowledge of those keys. However, a property that should be required of ID-based protocols isthat if two entities are communicating, then the KGC cannot derive the established session key. In addition, if at any stage the N . Mitrou et al.
BackgroundPolo-like kinase-1 (Plk1) plays a crucial role in cell proliferation and the inhibition of Plk1 has been considered as a potential target for specific inhibitory drugs in anti-cancer therapy. Several research groups have identified peptide-based inhibitors that target the polo-box domain (PBD) of Plk1 and bind to the protein with high affinity in in vitro assays. However, inadequate proteolytic resistance and cell permeability of the peptides hinder the development of these peptide-based inhibitors into novel therapeutic compounds.Methodology/Principal FindingsIn order to overcome the shortcomings of peptide-based inhibitors, we designed and synthesized small molecule inhibitors. Among these molecules, bg-34 exhibited a high binding affinity for Plk1-PBD and it could cross the cell membrane in its unmodified form. Furthermore, bg-34-dependent inhibition of Plk1-PBD was sufficient for inducing apoptosis in HeLa cells. Moreover, modeling studies performed on Plk1-PBD in complex with bg-34 revealed that bg-34 can interact effectively with Plk1-PBD.Conclusion/SignificanceWe demonstrated that the molecule bg-34 is a potential drug candidate that exhibits anti-Plk1-PBD activity and possesses the favorable characteristics of high cell permeability and stability. We also determined that bg-34 induced apoptotic cell death by inhibiting Plk1-PBD in HeLa cells at the same concentration as PEGylated 4j peptide, which can inhibit Plk1-PBD activity 1000 times more effectively than bg-34 can in in vitro assays. This study may help to design and develop drug-like small molecule as Plk1-PBD inhibitor for better therapeutic activity.
A keyword-searchable encryption scheme allows a user with a "trapdoor" for a keyword to efficiently retrieve some of encrypted data containing the specific keyword over a remote server. The scheme for keyword-searchable encryption is considered as one of crucial building blocks that solves the security problems of privacy and data confidentiality in many settings, such as outsourced database systems and mail (or file) servers. However, most existing schemes support only a single keyword for searching, but do not allow for boolean combinations of keywords. It makes the use of schemes impractical in real applications. To address this problem, we propose an efficient construction for conjunctive keyword-searchable encryption, in which the size of trapdoors is almost same as that for searching a single keyword. Our construction is proven secure against adaptive chosen-keyword attacks in the random oracle model under the external co-Diffie-Hellman assumption. Compared to previous works, our construction has much better performance in terms of both computational and communication cost.
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