It is argued here that Jayarāśi Bhaṭṭa (ca. 770–830 c.e .) is both a Cārvāka and a skeptic, although he is a skeptic about epistemology rather than a skeptic about the external world or a global skeptic about knowledge. After remarks on the Cārvākas and Indian skepticism, Jayarāśi’s arguments against Dignāga and Dharmakīrti are considered. Jayarāśi tries to demonstrate that in the context of epistemology, epistemology self-destructs, while in the context of everyday life there is no need for epistemology. Lastly, how Jayarāśi’s skepticism serves his Cārvāka sympathies is considered.
The Indian Buddhist philosopher Vasubandhu (c. 400 ce) has seldom been considered in conjunction with the problem of external-world skepticism despite the fact that his text, Twenty Verses, presents arguments from ignorance based on dreams. In this article, an epistemological phenomenalist interpretation of Vasubandhu is supported in opposition to a metaphysical idealist interpretation. On either interpretation, Vasubandhu gives an invitation to the problem of external-world skepticism, although his final conclusion is closer to skepticism on the epistemological phenomenalist interpretation. The article ends with reflections on what light Vasubandhu might shed on the issue of whether skepticism is a natural problem in epistemology as well as why, despite Vasubandhu, the skeptical problem was not a central issue in the later Indian tradition.
scite is a Brooklyn-based organization that helps researchers better discover and understand research articles through Smart Citations–citations that display the context of the citation and describe whether the article provides supporting or contrasting evidence. scite is used by students and researchers from around the world and is funded in part by the National Science Foundation and the National Institute on Drug Abuse of the National Institutes of Health.