B l a c k w e l l P u b l i s h i n g , L t d . O x f o r d , U K J T S B J o u r n a l f o r t h e T h e o r y o f S o c i a l B e h a v i o u r 0 0 2 1 -8 3 0 8 © T h e E x e c u t i v e M a n a g e m e n t C o m m i t t e e / B l a c k w e l l P u b l i s h i n g L t d . 2 0 0 4 D e c e m b e r 2 0 0 4 3 4 4O r i g i n a l A r t i c l e R a t i o n a l i t y a n d C h a n c e E r n e s t K r a u s z Ernest Krauszwhere possibly chance plays a role. The central questions I wish to address are: whether purely rational choice is possible; whether choices may be induced by chance alone; or whether there is always a mixture of rationality and chance, as well as other factors such as habit, imitation and irrationality, when choosing an action? I should predicate my inquiry into "choice of action" by stating that the discussion pertains to action which can be explained by its antecedents: such as the reasons and preferences of the agent to act in a certain way; the particular state of mind in which the agent is when deliberating what action to choose; and the state of the world in which he chooses and carries out his action. All these factors influence his choice, yet this is not incompatible with the notion of "free choice"-in other words, his action is not pre-determined (Ginet, 1997).Let me elaborate somewhat on the above statement. The question is whether the very fact that the agent is weighing up his options, in a quest to decide what action to take, will or will not alter the factors which we call "the antecedents". Facing the need to decide what action to go for may make him shift his preferences, change his attitudes and frame of mind, and "see" the state of the world from the particular vantage point of the choice situation. It might still be claimed that at time t when the choice was made, say, as to how to invest in a volatile stock market or how to travel during a transit strike, there were certain antecedents X,Y,Z, which determined his choice. My argument, however, is that it is a fact that at time − − − − t when he became aware of the need to make a choice, his preferences, his state of mind and his view of the state of the world might have been different from what they became at time t due to the flexible nature of these factors during the period of deliberation. My claim is, therefore, that his action is not pre-determined by some previous rigidly established factors, but that the action is an outcome of the process of choice itself. My approach is that of a factualist, hence I do not take into account the metaphysical notion which upholds the deterministic view that since all the factors leading to and producing the choice of action were antecedent to it, the choice was in that sense predetermined. This would acknowledge a mind-independent world upheld by realists (Khlentzos, 2001). Thus, although the realist would not deny the apparent possibility of human beings choosing among alternative actions, according to him the actual choice will have been pre-determined. A factualist approach, on the other...
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