We examine the impact of board characteristics on the speed of adjustment and the capital structure dynamics of firms in bank-based economies. Using 3927 firm-year observations over a 10-year (2009–2019), we find that board characteristic influences firms' speed of adjustment in a bank-based (stakeholder-oriented) system. We also find some evidence that board characteristics have varying impacts on the capital structure of Japanese, French and German firms. We conclude that firms' capital structure reflects the corporate governance environment they operate. Our results are robust to accounting for endogeneity and alternative leverage measure.

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Purpose This study aims to examine the influence of the quality of voluntary disclosure (QVD) on earnings management (EM) amongst a sample of commercial banks in the Middle East and North Africa (MENA) region. Design/methodology/approach Using a sample of 1,060 bank-year observations for the period 2006–2015, this paper developed a three-dimensional framework to measure the QVD, which considers the quantity, spread and usefulness of the information. Furthermore, this study examines the QVD-EM nexus using an ordinary least squares regression model. This technique is supplemented with conducting an instrumental variable regression model and a two-stage least squares model to overcome the potential occurrence of endogeneity problems. Findings The findings suggest that QVD is negatively attributed to EM in the context of MENA banks. The findings also confirm that the quality of financial reporting is enhanced by QVD dimensions that were considered in the framework, leading banks to less engagement in EM practices. In contrast, the influence of the quantity dimension (level) of the disclosed information has an insignificant impact on EM, while the spread and usefulness dimensions of VD are negatively and significantly associated with EM in the region. Research limitations/implications Although the results are robust to various measurements and to the possible occurrence of endogeneity problems, there are a few limitations should be acknowledged, which provides opportunities for future research. For example, the sample size is relatively small due to data accessibility issues. Likewise, the findings of the research might not be appropriate for non-financial sectors. These limitations provide a good opportunity for future studies to expand on the research by covering other developing economies and, thereby, enriching the understanding offered by this study. Practical implications This study offers several implications for bank managers, academics and policymakers. Firstly, it may help managers to appreciate the function and the importance of QVD in mitigating EM. Secondly, for academics, the study provides suggestive evidence on the impact of QVD on EM; however, future research may need to consider the role of morality and ethical behaviour across different environments in reducing excessive risk-taking and constraining earnings manipulation. Finally, it provides insights for policymakers and regulators to develop a framework or guidance that can help banks in providing high-QVD in the context of developing economies. Originality/value The study distinctively develops an innovative measurement for QVD using a new multi-dimensional model. This paper also bring new evidence on QVD complexity and its impact on EM practice from an under-researched developing context, namely, the MENA region.

Theoretical arguments suggest that capital structure will adjust to the dynamics of the corporate governance environment. In line with this prediction, we examine the impact of board characteristics on capital structure dynamics and the speed of adjustment. Using 2690 firm-year observations for 2009-2018, we find that firms in a stakeholder-oriented corporate governance environment adjust their leverage faster than those in a shareholder-oriented environment. We also find that corporate board characteristics influence firms' capital structure and speed of adjustment towards target leverage. Our findings are robust to alternative measures of leverage and endogeneity. The overall evidence supports the relevance of the corporate board's composition in both shareholder-oriented and stakeholder-oriented corporate governanc (CG) environments. We conclude that board composition mitigates agency conflict.

Purpose This paper aims to examine the relationship between audit characteristics (ACs) and audit fees on classification shifting (CS) among German-listed non-financial firms. Design/methodology/approach Using a sample of 130 German-listed (Deutscher Aktienindex, Mid Cap dax and Small caps Index) firms from 2010 until 2019, this study investigated the impact of audit committee size, audit committee meetings, audit committee financial expertise and audit fees on CS. Findings This study found the evidence of CS, meaning that managers misclassify recurring expenses in the income statement into non-recurring expenses to inflate core earnings. This study also found that the audit fee ratio, audit committee financial expertise and frequency of audit meetings are negatively associated with CS among German-listed firms. However, the audit committee size does not influence CS. Research limitations/implications This study will help the board improve its internal auditing practices and provide essential information to investors to assess how ACs affect the quality of financial reporting. Originality/value This study focused on a bank-oriented economy, i.e. Germany, with lower investor protection and low transparency. This paper documents new evidence on how ACs and audit fees impact CS among German firms, as most of the previous studies on CS mainly focused on market-oriented economies such as the UK and the USA.