Standard-Nutzungsbedingungen:Die Dokumente auf EconStor dürfen zu eigenen wissenschaftlichen Zwecken und zum Privatgebrauch gespeichert und kopiert werden.Sie dürfen die Dokumente nicht für öffentliche oder kommerzielle Zwecke vervielfältigen, öffentlich ausstellen, öffentlich zugänglich machen, vertreiben oder anderweitig nutzen.Sofern die Verfasser die Dokumente unter Open-Content-Lizenzen (insbesondere CC-Lizenzen) zur Verfügung gestellt haben sollten, gelten abweichend von diesen Nutzungsbedingungen die in der dort genannten Lizenz gewährten Nutzungsrechte. Supporters of public disclosure of personal tax information point to its deterrent effect on tax evasion, but this effect has not been empirically explored. Although Norway has a long tradition of public disclosure of tax filings, it took a new direction in 2001 when anyone with access to the Internet could obtain individual information on income, wealth, and income and wealth taxes paid. We exploit this change in the degree of exposure to identify the effects of public disclosure on income reporting. Identification of the deterrence effects of public disclosure is facilitated by the fact that, prior to the shift to the Internet in 2001, some municipalities had exposure which was close to the Internet type of public disclosure, as tax information was distributed widely through paper catalogues that were locally produced and disseminated. We observe income changes that are consistent with public disclosure deterring tax evasion: an approximately 3 percent average increase in reported income is found among business owners living in areas where the switch to Internet disclosure represented a large change in access. Terms of use: Documents inJEL-Code: H300, H250.

Abstract:The Carnegie effect (Holtz-Eakin, Joualfaian and Rosen, 1993) refers to the idea that inherited wealth harms recipient's work efforts, and possesses a key role in the discussion of taxation of intergenerational transfers. However, Carnegie effect estimates are few, reflecting that such effects are hard to trace in data. Most previous studies have relied on data from limited size sample surveys. Here we use information from a rich administrative data set covering the entire Norwegian population, which makes it possible to undertake a detailed examination of the Carnegie effect, including how it varies across groups of recipients. The estimation results show significant reductions in labor supply for recipients of large inheritances, in the range from 7 to 10 percent in the first six years after the transfer. Moreover, we find that the Carnegie effects differ according to the size of the transfer, the age of the recipients, the recipient's eligibility to other transfer programs, and the existence of new heirs in the family chain. SammendragDen store industrimagnaten Andrew Carnegie (1835-1919) mente at barn ikke hadde godt av å arve formue fordi det ville undergrave deres vilje til å arbeide. I denne studien undersøker vi om den såkalte Carnegie-effekten, altså at arv fører til redusert arbeidsinnsats, er av stor betydning i Norge.Videre undersøker vi om det er en midlertidig eller en varig effekt, og hvordan responsen varierer mellom husholdningstyper. Vi finner en signifikant reduksjon i arbeidsinntekten til personer som arver mer enn en gjennomsnittlig stor arv, på om lag 7 til 10 prosent. Effekten er størst i de første to til tre årene etter arven, men også så lenge som seks år etter er det en signifikant negativ effekt. Unge arvemottakere og mottakere naer pensjonsalder reduserer arbeidstilbudet mest, og enslige mer enn gifte med små barn. Vi har en hypotese om at arvinger som selv har livsarvinger har en lavere tilbøyelighet til å bruke arven på seg selv enn arvinger uten egne livsarvinger, altså at man føler et ansvar for å videreføre ressursene til neste generasjon. Derfor ser vi spesielt på om arvemottakere uten egne livsarvinger er mer tilbøyelige til å bruke arven på seg selv, i form av mer fritid og mindre arbeid. Vi finner at dette stemmer. Å skattlegge arven reduserer Carnegie-effekten, og øker dermed arbeidstilbudet. Resultatene har også implikasjoner for hvordan arveavgiftssystemet bør utformes.Både progressive satser og lavere sats for livsarvinger støttes av våre resultater.

An evaluation strategy for answering the question, “Is the tax schedule more redistributive after a reform than prior to a reform?” is presented. The procedure builds upon addressing measures of tax redistribution, utilizing micro data from periods before and after the reform. Tax redistributional effects are measured in terms of a “common base” approach, which means that a benchmark is established which facilitates identifying how the redistributional efforts of policy makers develop over time. When applying this method for evaluation of the 2006 Norwegian tax reform, the results suggest that the modification of the dual income tax system of the 2006 reform has improved the redistributional effect of the schedule. This conclusion is qualified by addressing measurement challenges brought up by the reform, such as behavioral responses and timing effects.