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Self-report personality questionnaires often contain validity scales designed to flag individuals who intentionally distort their responses toward a more favorable characterization of themselves. Yet, there are no clear directives on how scores on these scales should be used by administrators when making high-stakes decisions about respondents. Two studies were conducted to investigate whether administrator-initiated retesting of flagged individuals represents a viable response to managing intentional distortion on personality questionnaires. We explored the effectiveness of retesting by considering whether retest responses are more accurate representations of a flagged individual's personality characteristics. A comparison of retest scores to a baseline measure of personality indicated that such scores were more accurate. Retesting should only work as a strategy for dealing with intentional distortion when individuals choose to respond more accurately the second time. Thus, we further explored the emotional reaction to being asked to retest as one possible explanation of why individuals who engage in intentional distortion respond more accurately upon retest.

Signaling theory suggests that resources such as firm reputation can send multiple signals that create dual pressures on stakeholders. These tensions are apparent when examining the relationship between a firm’s reputation and the collective voluntary turnover rates it experiences. On the one hand, a favorable reputation may tether employees to the firm due to the perceived desirability of working for a reputable company, resulting in lower voluntary turnover rates. On the other hand, a favorable reputation may make employees believe they are more marketable and thus may serve as a stepping stone relating to higher voluntary turnover rates. The purpose of this study is to investigate whether and when reputation acts as a signal of desirability or a signal of ease of movement in predicting collective voluntary turnover rates. We find some evidence for an overall tethering effect for more reputable firms. In addition, our findings demonstrate that reputation is more likely to result in stepping stone effects in certain signaling environments including when firms are in more munificent industries, are younger, and have higher pay levels. Tethering effects are observed when firms are in less munificent industries, are older, and have lower pay levels.

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