This study examines the relationship between educational attainment and euroscepticism from 1973 to 2010. Existing research has shown that, driven by utilitarian considerations, political cues and questions of collective identity, education and euroscepticism are negatively related. However, as the process of European unification has progressed, all three factors have become more salient, so we expect an increasing effect of education on euroscepticism over time. Using 81 waves of the Eurobarometer survey in 12 European Union (EU) member states, our results show that the impact of education on euroscepticism has indeed increased, particularly after the signing of the Maastricht Treaty.

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Electorates appear to be adrift. Across Western Europe electoral volatility is increasing. But are volatile voters whimsical? Do they behave randomly, like drift sand, or are they emancipated, not committed to a single political party but loyal to their own preferences? To answer these questions this study focuses on the Dutch electorate, which has become the most volatile in Western Europe. We analyse the extensive 1Vandaag Opinion Panel (1VOP) dataset, which covers 55,847 adult respondents who participated in at least 2 of the 58 waves between November 2006 and June 2010. 1VOP allows us to break down electoral volatility by type, direction (intra-bloc versus inter-bloc) and time span. We conclude that volatility reflects voter emancipation rather than disengagement. Although more than half of the respondents (55 percent) change party preference at least once, they mostly stick to one of two ideologically coherent party blocs. Especially middle groups are volatile: people with modal income, with average levels of education and who position themselves in the political centre. However, the lower educated are more likely to switch between dissimilar parties. Our findings question the socialization model: although older voters are relatively loyal when they cast their ballots, they are the most volatile in the years in between.

How is euroscepticism related to left–right ideology in Western European public opinion? We argue that inconsistent findings on this relationship result from the changing nature of European integration over time. Initially, EU market integration mainly sparked left-wing opposition; after Maastricht the intensification of political integration additionally produced nationalist euroscepticism among the political right. Hence, we hypothesize that the relationship between citizens’ left–right ideology and euroscepticism evolved from linear to U-shaped. We test this hypothesis by means of multilevel logistic regression on 74 waves of the Eurobarometer (1973–2010) in 12 EU member states. The results demonstrate an increase of right-wing euroscepticism across countries, whereas the developments on the left are mixed. In the concluding section, we discuss the theoretical and political implications of these findings.

This article examines whether political trust is a relatively more rational attitude for citizens with a higher level of education. Previous research has found the higher educated to have greater political attentiveness, knowledge and understanding. The proposition that they, consequently, trust politics in a more rational way has not been tested. The present study analyses how higher and lower educated citizens construct their political trust, by assessing the extent to which political trust is internally consistent, domain-specific and consistent with political evaluations across educational groups. This is explored by applying Mokken scale analysis and structural equation modeling to data from the 2010 Dutch Parliamentary Election Survey. The findings indicate that political trust is not a fundamentally different construct for the higher and lower educated. Political trust is, to some extent, a rational attitude for all citizens.

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We examine whether context matters for the integration of second-generation children of migrants into Western educational systems. Using data on ten destination countries and on five distinct educational outcomes at various stages of the educational career, we study educational inequalities between the second-generation immigrants and their majority peers. We find that institutional and migration variables affect the magnitude of ethnic educational disadvantage, even when social background is accounted for. Ethnic inequality is greater in countries like Belgium and Germany with more strongly tracked educational systems, and in countries with limited multicultural policies. In contrast, ethnic inequality is lower if the first-generation migrants are selected based on their skills, compared with the non-migrant population in origin countries. Our interpretation is that more positively selected migrants are more ambitious for their children to succeed within Western educational systems, and their children are more likely to take advantage of the opportunities offered them.

In the midst of heated debates surrounding the veracity and honesty of communication, scholarly attention has turned to the conceptualization of mis- and disinformation on the supply-side of (political) communication. Yet, we lack systematic research on the conceptualization of perceived mis- and disinformation on the demand-side. Original survey data collected in ten European countries ( N = 6,643) shows that news consumers distinguish general misinformation from disinformation. Yet, the high correlation between the two dimensions indicates that disinformation perceptions may be regarded as a sub-type of misinformation perceptions in which intentional deception is a core element. This paper aims to make a contribution to the misinformation and media credibility literature by proposing a first conceptualization of perceived untruthfulness corresponding to increasing levels of cynicism and skepticism toward the factual status and honesty of information.