The relationship between retirement and mortality is studied with a unique administrative data set covering the full population of Norway. A series of retirement policy changes in Norway reduced the retirement age for a group of workers but not for others. Difference-in-differences estimation based on monthly birth cohorts and treatment group status show that the early retirement programme significantly reduced the retirement age; this holds true also when we account for programme substitution, for example into the disability pension. Instrumental variables estimation results show no effect on mortality of retirement age; neither do estimation results from a hazard rate model.

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Standard-Nutzungsbedingungen:Die Dokumente auf EconStor dürfen zu eigenen wissenschaftlichen Zwecken und zum Privatgebrauch gespeichert und kopiert werden.Sie dürfen die Dokumente nicht für öffentliche oder kommerzielle Zwecke vervielfältigen, öffentlich ausstellen, öffentlich zugänglich machen, vertreiben oder anderweitig nutzen.Sofern die Verfasser die Dokumente unter Open-Content-Lizenzen (insbesondere CC-Lizenzen) zur Verfügung gestellt haben sollten, gelten abweichend von diesen Nutzungsbedingungen die in der dort genannten Lizenz gewährten Nutzungsrechte. Terms of use: Documents in AbstractWe study the effect of salience in the social security benefit system on labor earnings by exploiting kinks and notches in budget lines introduced by earnings testing and social security accrual mechanisms for 67-69 year old workers in Norway. An earnings test had large effects on labor earnings, while an accrual system discontinuity had no discernible effects. We interpret the difference as likely to be caused by a lack of salience in the accrual incentives: agents are not able or willing to take into account the value of future benefit increases when considering the relevant rewards to working..

Norwegian administrative data are used to evaluate the impact of a doubling of the threshold in the retirement earnings test. We find almost no impact on the extensive margin, but a positive effect on the intensive margin. This positive effect is uneven over the earnings distribution, and concentrated on workers around the threshold, increasing with exposure to the reform and leading to a decrease in earnings inequality. Individuals who remain active until retirement age respond more to the reform. Conditional on prereform earnings, we find little evidence that individual characteristics such as working histories influence the responsiveness to the reform.

Various unemployment duration models are estimated on a large Norwegian dataset covering labour market history 1. 1.1989-31.12.1992 for all persons who became unemployed during October 1990. As many unemployed leave the unemployment register without going directly to a job, two alternative definitions of unemployment are usedregister unemployment and joblessness. The problem of heterogeneity is addressed both by partitioning the individuals into four categories by previous unemployment history, and by including a random term in the job hazard. Observed as well as unobserved heterogeneity affects the estimates of expected duration to a great extent. When gamma-distributed unobserved heterogeneity is accounted for, the estimates of duration dependence become more positive relative to models where unobserved heterogeneity is ignored. Among persons who are entitled to unemployment benefit, the duration dependence appears to be significantly positive. Alternative specifications of the baseline hazard hardly affect estimates of the effects of the covariates on duration.