Empirical legitimacy, defined as social acceptance of the right to rule, constitutes a key condition for effective governance in areas of limited statehood. Most work on legitimacy, however, is state centric and has exclusively focused on the state as the governance actor of interest. We argue that understanding the legitimacy of external and nonstate actors is essential for analyzing governance in areas of limited statehood. Moreover, subnational variations in legitimacy matter. While most studies of the legitimacy of governance actors have focused on the macroregional and national levels, a governance actor may enjoy high legitimacy in one part of a country but be considered illegitimate in other parts. Finally, the multiple sources and consequences of empirical legitimacy in areas of limited statehood have to be analyzed in greater depth. There is no single source of legitimacy, nor is there a single guaranteed consequence of legitimacy.

Effective and legitimate governance supposedly form a mutually reinforcing relationship, a virtuous circle of governance. We critically explore this argument in the context of limited statehood and underline why such areas challenge key assumptions underpinning the virtuous circle argument. In this special issue we ask: Does the effectiveness of governance affect the legitimacy of governance actors and institutions in areas of limited statehood, and vice versa? We develop a theoretical model of the virtuous circle and show that making such circles work is more complex, demanding and unlikely than often assumed. Empirical studies need to take these complexities into account, and policy makers are well-advised to adjust their policies accordingly.

Using ISAF's security involvement in Afghanistan as an example, this article asks: Does the perceived provision of goods and services affect the empirical legitimacy attributed to external governance actors in areas of limited statehood? The study applies multilevel analysis to survey data for 2009-2013 from Northeast Afghanistan. The results support arguments of performance-based legitimacy. Perceptions of goods and service provision as effective have a positive impact on the legitimacy of external governance actors. However, the analysis underlines that this relationship is no automatism and that it depends on the attribution of governance effectiveness to a specific governance actor. In other words, no attribution, no legitimacy. Successfully linking more effective governance with more legitimacy is a possible impetus for a virtuous circle of governance.

The EU is surrounded by areas of limited statehood (ALS) and contested orders (CO) in its southern and eastern neighbourhood. Resilience has become a focus of attention in the academic debate on how to successfully deal with ALS and CO. Moreover, resilience-building is a new cornerstone in the EU's foreign and security policy. However, to what extent is resilience a mechanism to cope with ALS and CO? What are the sources of resilience? To what extent does the EU act as a resilience builder or spoiler in its neighbourhood? By presenting a new conceptual framework for analysing the interplay between risks, resilience, and governance breakdown/ violent conflict as well as through in-depth empirical evidence, this special issue puts forward three key arguments. First, resilience is a key mechanism to prevent governance breakdown and violent conflict in the EU's neighbourhood. Second, three sources are key in building resilience: Social trust within societies and communities, legitimacy of (state and non-state) governance actors and institutions, as well as effective, fair, and inclusive governance institutions. Third, if external actors, such as the EU, seek to build resilience, they need to factor in long-time horizons, in-depth local knowledge, and a clearly designed strategy.

Limited statehood is frequently depicted as a major cause for civil war and violent conflict. Consequently, state-building efforts are often considered to be an effective tool for the prevention of civil war and violent conflict. This essay argues, however, that this assumption is misguided in several respects. First, at present and historically, areas of limited statehood are the global default rather than the exception. Thus, efforts to eliminate limited statehood would likely be unsuccessful. Second, limited statehood does not equal civil war and violence. In fact, only a small fraction of areas of limited statehood are affected by civil war. Third, a too-narrow focus on state-building may be counterproductive, as it may foster ineffective or even predatory state institutions. Such a focus also ignores the plurality of governance actors beyond the state that are relevant for effective governance–such as service provision and rule-making–in areas of limited statehood. Therefore, external actors like international organizations and foreign powers should contribute to governance-building rather than state-building, with a focus on service provision and rule-making institutions with a broader scope than the state.