. We thank CFO Magazine for helping us conduct the surveys, though we note that our analysis and conclusions do not necessarily reflect those of CFO. We thank Benjamin Ee and Hyunseob Kim for excellent research assistance.

We thank CFO Magazine for helping us conduct the surveys, though we note that our analysis and conclusions do not necessarily reflect those of CFO. We thank Benjamin Ee and Hyunseob Kim for excellent research assistance.

We characterize the relation between asset structure and capital structure by exploiting variation in the salability of corporate assets. To establish this link, we distinguish across different assets in firms’ balance sheets (machinery, land, and buildings) and use an instrumental approach that incorporates market conditions for those assets. We also use a natural experiment driving differential increases in the supply of real estate assets across the United States: The Defense Base Closure and Realignment Act of 1990. Consistent with a supply-side view of capital structure, we find that asset redeployability is a main driver of leverage when credit frictions are high.

We test the Shleifer-Vishny hypothesis that asset liquidation values influence both firm leverage and the choice of debt maturity. Using panel data on real estate investment trusts, we estimate a simultaneous equation model and find that firms specializing in the most (least) liquid assets use more (less) leverage and longer (shorter) maturities. The evidence also suggests that, for REITs, debt maturity and leverage are substitutes, consistent with the theory and predictions of Barclay, Marx and Smith. Copyright 2008 American Real Estate and Urban Economics Association

Abstract. We use a unique data set to show how firms in Europe used credit lines during the financial crisis. We find that firms with restricted access to credit (small, private, non-investment-grade, and unprofitable) draw more funds from their credit lines during the crisis than their large, public, investment-grade, profitable counterparts. Interest spreads increased (especially in ''market-based economies''), but commitment fees remained unchanged. Our findings suggest that credit lines did not dry up during the crisis and provided the liquidity that firms used to cope with this exceptional contraction. In particular, credit lines provided the liquidity companies needed to invest during the crisis.