This work addresses the autonomous organization of biological systems. It does so by considering the boundaries of biological systems, from individual cells to Home sapiens, in terms of the presence of Markov blankets under the active inference scheme—a corollary of the free energy principle. A Markov blanket defines the boundaries of a system in a statistical sense. Here we consider how a collective of Markov blankets can self-assemble into a global system that itself has a Markov blanket; thereby providing an illustration of how autonomous systems can be understood as having layers of nested and self-sustaining boundaries. This allows us to show that: (i) any living system is a Markov blanketed system and (ii) the boundaries of such systems need not be co-extensive with the biophysical boundaries of a living organism. In other words, autonomous systems are hierarchically composed of Markov blankets of Markov blankets—all the way down to individual cells, all the way up to you and me, and all the way out to include elements of the local environment.

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This paper considers the emergence of a generalised synchrony in ensembles of coupled self-organising systems, such as neurons. We start from the premise that any self-organising system complies with the free energy principle, in virtue of placing an upper bound on its entropy. Crucially, the free energy principle allows one to interpret biological systems as inferring the state of their environment or external milieu. An emergent property of this inference is synchronisation among an ensemble of systems that infer each other. Here, we investigate the implications of neuronal dynamics by simulating neuronal networks, where each neuron minimises its free energy. We cast the ensuing ensemble dynamics in terms of inference and show that cardinal behaviours of neuronal networks – both in vivo and in vitro – can be explained by this framework. In particular, we test the hypotheses that (i) generalised synchrony is an emergent property of free energy minimisation; thereby explaining synchronisation in the resting brain: (ii) desynchronisation is induced by exogenous input; thereby explaining event-related desynchronisation and (iii) structure learning emerges in response to causal structure in exogenous input; thereby explaining functional segregation in real neuronal systems.

Biological self-organisation is a process of spontaneous pattern formation; namely the emergence of coherent and stable systemic configurations that distinguish themselves from their environment. This process can occur at various spatial scales: from the microscopic (giving rise to cells) to the macroscopic (the emergence of organisms). Self-organisation at each level is essential to account for the hierarchical organisation of living organisms (organelles within cells, within tissues, within organs, etc.). In this paper, we pursue the idea that Markov blankets -statistical boundaries separating states that are external to a system from its internal states -emerge at every possible level of the description of the (living) system. Through simulations, we show that the concept of a Markov blanket is fundamental in defining biological systems and underwrites the nature and form of interactions between successive levels of hierarchical structure. We demonstrate the validity of our argument using simulations, based on the normative principle of variational free energy minimisation. Specifically, we adopt a top-down approach to provide a proof of concept for the claim that the self-organisation of Markov blankets (and blankets of blankets) underwrites the self-evidencing, autopoietic behaviour of living systems.

Sensorimotor coordination is thought to rely on cerebellar-based internal models for state estimation, but the underlying neural mechanisms and specific contribution of the cerebellar components is unknown. A central aspect of any inferential process is the representation of uncertainty or conversely precision characterizing the ensuing estimates. Here, we discuss the possible contribution of inhibition to the encoding of precision of neural representations in the granular layer of the cerebellar cortex. Within this layer, Golgi cells influence excitatory granule cells, and their action is critical in shaping information transmission downstream to Purkinje cells. In this review, we equate the ensuing excitation–inhibition balance in the granular layer with the outcome of a precision-weighted inferential process, and highlight the physiological characteristics of Golgi cell inhibition that are consistent with such computations.

Cerebellar computations are necessary for fine behavioural control and are thought to rely on internal probabilistic models performing state estimation. We propose that the cerebellum infers how states contextualise (i.e., interact with) each other, and coordinates extra-cerebellar neuronal dynamics underpinning a range of behaviours. To support this claim, we describe a cerebellar model for state estimation that includes states interactions, and link the underlying inference with the neuronal architecture and dynamics observed empirically. This is formalised using the free energy principle, which provides a dual perspective on a system in terms of both the dynamics of its physical -- in this case neuronal -- states, and the inference process they entail. As a proof of principle, we simulate cerebellar-dependent synchronisation of whisking and respiration, which are known to be tightly coupled in rodents. In summary, we suggest that cerebellar-dependent contextualisation of behaviour can explain its ubiquitous involvement in most aspects of behaviour.