The debate about justice in immigration seems somehow stagnated given that it seems justice requires both further exclusion and more porous borders. In the face of this, I propose to take a step back and to realize that the general problem of borders—to determine what kind of borders liberal democracies ought to have—gives rise to two particular problems: first, to justify exclusive control over the administration of borders (the problem of legitimacy of borders) and, second, to specify how this control ought to be exercised (the problem of justice of borders). The literature has explored the second but ignored the first. Therefore, I propose a different approach to the ethics of immigration by focusing on concerns of legitimacy in a three-step framework: first, identifying the kind of authority or power that immigration controls exercise; second, redefining borders as international and domestic institutions that issue that kind of power; and finally, considering supranational institutions that redistribute the right to exclude among legitimate borders.
This article assesses an assumption pervasive in one strain of arguments in favor of stringent immigration controls. The assumption affirms that—for the case of regular admissions—to a certain extent states are permitted to prioritize the interests of their citizens and residents by issuing exclusionary immigration policies (call this the priority assumption). Using the normative methodology of applied international ethics, I suggest some broad constraints to this priority assumption that have a bearing on justifications for current practical immigration policy in Europe, North America, and beyond. I do so by redefining borders as domestic-international institutions that open up borders not only to (internal) standards of justice but also to standards of international legitimacy.
RESUMENCon frecuencia, la autonomía de los pueblos y el respeto a los derechos humanos establecen un dilema: o se reconoce la autonomía (porque el no hacerlo sería discriminatorio) o se hace cumplir el principio de no-discriminación a costa de la autonomía de los pueblos. Pero sugiero que el dilema se Revista de Filosofía, Letras y Humanidades desinfla cuando distinguimos el daño especial que hace la discriminación y cuando distinguimos el interés que tienen los miembros de un pueblo de tener una buena vida, del interés fundamental que tenemos todos de vivir bien. El uso de estas categorías dworkineanas permite ver que el daño tan distinguible que provoca la discriminación, requiere moralmente el abandonar la pretensión de "sentirnos como en casa" en nuestros pueblos (es decir parte de las condiciones que proporcionan una buena vida) y aceptar las condiciones que hacen posible que todos vivan bien.Palabras clave: Discriminación. Autonomía Indígena. Multiculturalismo. Legitimidad Democrática. ABSTRACTOften, first nation´s political self-determination and the respect of human rights poses a dilemma: either we respect and recognize their autonomy, or we ban acts of discrimination even though we jeopardize their autonomy. But here I suggest that this dilemma deflates when we clarify the special nature of what's harmful with discrimination, and when we use the dworkinean categories to distinguish the interest members have in having a good life, from the fundamental interest we all have in living well. What's harmful with discrimination morally requires we abandon the aspiration of "feeling at home" in our peoples and accept the conditions that make possible for everyone else to live well.
It is often asserted that people are conditioned to act corruptly by their culture in a way they cannot help themselves. The aim of this paper is to use a multidisciplinary approach, both from political theory and political science, to show that this kind of narrative about corruption is flawed because it is not informative at all about the nature of corruption. This prevents it from leading to any type of meaningful analysis or policy design. We will concentrate on two main flaws: The Triviality Objection, which points out that everything humans do is cultural in some sense or other, and the Circularity Objection, which stresses that attempting to explain why or how corruption becomes part of a specific culture, leads to saying that it is because its members act corruptly. The idea that the cultural causation is flawed becomes persuasive when we contrast that view with our concept of corruption as a special kind of harm to institutional rules: corruption may refer to a parallel set of conventions or rules that undermines the institutional set of morally justified norms.
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