As suggested by its name, the 1-2-3 Survey is a three-phase survey. The basic rationale of this tool is the following. The first phase is an augmented labour force survey (LFS). It documents and analyses labour market functioning and is used as a filter for the second phase to identify a representative sample of IF heads who are then interviewed. Phase 2 is designed to measure the firms' main economic and productive characteristics (production, value-added, investment and financing), the main difficulties encountered developing the business, and demand for public support by informal entrepreneurs. Lastly, in the third phase, a specific income/expenditure survey is administered to a sub-sample of households selected from phase 1 to estimate the weights of the formal and informal sectors in household consumption by product and household type. Phase 3, not used in this paper, is also used to estimate households' living standards and monetary poverty, based on either income or expenditure.

Quels sont les individus les plus enclins à recourir à la corruption ? A qui demande-ton des pots-devin ? Qui en payent ? Cet article explore ces questions à partir d'un riche corpus d'enquêtes-ménages comparables réalisées dans continent où la corruption sévit avec beaucoup d'acuité : les enquêtes Afrobaromètre. Afin de répondre à ces questions, il s'interroge également sur les caractéristiques des utilisateurs des services publics en Afrique. Notre article apporte des résultats nouveaux tant sur la propension à corrompre et l'exposition à la corruption que sur les déterminants de l'utilisation des services publics. Nos estimations montrent notamment que les facteurs d'appartenance ethnique, traditionnellement mis en avant en Afrique, ne jouent pas un rôle aussi clair sur la corruption que ne le suggère la littérature.

This paper studies the effects of armed conflict on social capital in Mali, where a violent conflict has been raging since 2012. We examine the conflict's impacts on associational membership using event location data and unique survey data on governance, peace and security (GPS-SHaSA). We show that, in conflict-exposed areas, adult involvement in associations increases from 7 to 14 percentage points. Instrumental variable and difference-indifferences strategies complementary mitigate reverse causation and omitted variable biases as estimated results remain very consistent. Robust estimations constrained to non-migrants samples also rule out selection into migration. Yet this result, consistent with the argument that armed conflict cultivates social engagement, is not a positive outcome in the case of Mali. The increase is observed solely for family and political associations, which are comparatively inward-looking and act as interest groups. We interpret this finding as a form of withdrawal behind group or community boundaries, an interpretation supported by further analysis of interpersonal trust. This sort of withdrawal may exacerbate ethnic divisions and deepen the conflict.