This study examines the causal relationship between CEO pay and firm performance in Nigeria for the period 1998-2010, using annual data of 63 non-financial listed firms. We adopt a two-step dynamic generalized method of moments to explore the causal relationship. The study establishes a bi-directional relationship between CEO pay and firm performance. While CEO pay Granger-causes firm performance, firm performance also Granger-causes CEO pay. It implies that CEO pay acts both as a reward and a performance motivator. This study therefore suggests that CEO pay effectively aligns shareholders' interests with those of CEOs; hence stakeholders should focus more on CEO pay as a corporate governance mechanism to reduce agency problem in non-financial listed firms in Nigeria. 429Moreover, following the two modelling strategies, empirical studies on the relationship between CEO pay and firm performance occupy a substantial portion of economic literature, most especially in advanced countries and emerging economies with limited attention from developing countries and sub-Saharan Africa in particular. Meanwhile, previous empirical investigations have continued to yield conflicting results. Some of these studies have obtained a weak or negative relationship or none at all (Jensen and Murphy, ). Results continue to differ depending on the environment, methodology and the measures of firm performance adopted in various studies.Apart from the inconclusiveness of previous studies, the bulk of these studies ignored the effect of executive pay on firm performance, despite the fact that motivation is the main rationale for executive pay packages. This was hinted at by Jensen and Murphy (1990) who stated that executive pay is 'designed to give manager incentives to select and implement actions that increase shareholders' wealth'. Moreover, Buck et al. (2008) and Tosi et al. (2000) contended that all studies surveyed, most especially in Europe, used pay as the dependent variable which means firm performance is considered a determinant of executive pay, neglecting the possibility of feedback effect from pay to performance. The prevalence of long-term incentives (equity incentives), such as stock awards and options, for managers in Europe has made it extremely difficult to separate reward from motivation (Buck et al., 2008;Jegede, 2012;Olaniyi and Obembe, 2015;Liang et al., 2016;Omoregie and Kelikume, 2017). Hence, the majority of empirical studies from advanced countries focused on the effect of firm performance on directors' compensation (performance-based pay) without exploring the possibility of feedback. Meanwhile, executive directors of publicly traded firms in developing countries, most especially sub-Saharan Africa, are usually paid in cash, not in the form of long-term incentives such as equity-based pay. This gives ample opportunity to examine CEO pay as a factor that determines firm performance (Buck et al., 2008). Globally, only few studies (Choo and Tan, 2004;Buck et al., 2008;Omoregie and Kelikume, 2017; Amdouni, 2016) h...