We argue that the superlative modifiers at least and at most quantify over a scale of answers to the current question under discussion (and in this sense, resolve issues), and that they draw attention to the individual possibilities along the scale (and in this sense, raise issues for discussion). The point of departure is a simple analysis on which at least denotes what only presupposes, and at most denotes what only contributes as its ordinary atissue content. This analysis captures the truth conditions, focus-sensitivity, and distribution of superlative modifiers but leaves some pragmatic facts unexplained. We enrich the simple account with unrestricted inquisitive semantics in order to explain the fact that superlative modifiers give rise to ignorance implicatures while comparative modifiers like more and less do not, the fact that superlative modifiers do not give rise to scalar implicatures, and two puzzles concerning the interaction between superlative modifiers and deontic modals. We argue that this proposal provides the most empirically successful published account of superlative modifiers to date.

This paper distinguishes between definiteness and determinacy. Definiteness is seen as a morphological category which, in English, marks a (weak) uniqueness presupposition, while determinacy consists in denoting an individual. Definite descriptions are argued to be fundamentally predicative, presupposing uniqueness but not existence, and to acquire existential import through general type-shifting operations that apply not only to definites, but also indefinites and possessives. Through these shifts, argumental definite descriptions may become either determinate (and thus denote an individual) or indeterminate (functioning as an existential quantifier). The latter option is observed in examples like 'Anna didn't give the only invited talk at the conference', which, on its indeterminate reading, implies that there is nothing in the extension of 'only invited talk at the conference'. The paper also offers a resolution of the issue of whether possessives are inherently indefinite or definite, suggesting that, like indefinites, they do not mark definiteness lexically, but like definites, they typically yield determinate readings due to a general preference for the shifting operation that produces them.

We offer a new analysis of the semantics of the English it-cleft, building on recent work on exclusive particles such as "only." The analysis emphasizes the discourse function of clefts — which, we claim, is to terminate a line of inquiry by marking an answer as complete. It accounts for the semantic effects — not previously appreciated — of focus placement within the cleft pivot. It also provides a solution to a previously discussed problem with the projection of exhaustivity from embedded contexts.

This paper provides a lexical entry schema for exclusives covering the adverbs only, just, exclusively, merely, purely, solely, simply, and the adjectives only, sole, pure, exclusive and alone. We argue, on the basis of inter-paraphrasability relations among these exclusives and entailments involving at least and at most, that all of these items make an at-issue contribution of an upper bound on the viable answers to the current question under discussion (expressible with at most), and signal that a lower bound on those answers (expressible with at least) is taken for granted. The lexical entry schema accommodates two main points of variation, which makes it possible to capture the differences in meaning among these terms: (i) semantic type (restricted to the class of modifiers), and (ii) constraints on the current question under discussion or the strength ranking over its alternative possible answers. We propose 22 different specific instantiations of the schema for exclusives in English.