As algorithms are increasingly used to make important decisions that affect human lives, ranging from social benefit assignment to predicting risk of criminal recidivism, concerns have been raised about the fairness of algorithmic decision making. Most prior works on algorithmic fairness normatively prescribe how fair decisions ought to be made. In contrast, here, we descriptively survey users for how they perceive and reason about fairness in algorithmic decision making.A key contribution of this work is the framework we propose to understand why people perceive certain features as fair or unfair to be used in algorithms. Our framework identifies eight properties of features, such as relevance, volitionality and reliability, as latent considerations that inform people's moral judgments about the fairness of feature use in decision-making algorithms. We validate our framework through a series of scenario-based surveys with 576 people. We find that, based on a person's assessment of the eight latent properties of a feature in our exemplar scenario, we can accurately (> 85%) predict if the person will judge the use of the feature as fair.Our findings have important implications. At a high-level, we show that people's unfairness concerns are multi-dimensional and argue that future studies need to address unfairness concerns beyond discrimination. At a low-level, we find considerable disagreements in people's fairness judgments. We identify root causes of the disagreements, and note possible pathways to resolve them.
The COVID-19 pandemic spread across the world in late 2019 and early 2020. As the pandemic spread, technologists joined forces with public health officials to develop apps to support COVID-19 response. Yet, for these technological solutions to benefit public health, users must be willing to adopt these apps. This article details a framework of inputs to a user's decision to adopt a COVID-19 contact-tracing app or other COVID-19 technology along four major axes: technology benefits, solution accuracy, privacy considerations, and mobile-related costs. This framework is empirically validated via both the literature and a demographically-representative survey of 1,000 Americans. CCS Concepts: • Human-centered computing • Security and privacy → Human and societal aspects of security and privacy;
Security and privacy researchers often rely on data collected from Amazon Mechanical Turk (MTurk) to evaluate security tools, to understand users' privacy preferences and to measure online behavior. Yet, little is known about how well Turkers' survey responses and performance on security-and privacy-related tasks generalizes to a broader population. This paper takes a first step toward understanding the generalizability of security and privacy user studies by comparing users' selfreports of their security and privacy knowledge, past experiences, advice sources, and behavior across samples collected using MTurk (n=480), a census-representative web-panel (n=428), and a probabilistic telephone sample (n=3,000) statistically weighted to be accurate within 2.7% of the true prevalence in the U.S. Surprisingly, the results suggest that: (1) MTurk responses regarding security and privacy experiences, advice sources, and knowledge are more representative of the U.S. population than are responses from the census-representative panel; (2) MTurk and general population reports of security and privacy experiences, knowledge, and advice sources are quite similar for respondents who are younger than 50 or who have some college education; and (3) respondents' answers to the survey questions we ask are stable over time and robust to relevant, broadlyreported news events. Further, differences in responses cannot be ameliorated with simple demographic weighting, possibly because MTurk and panel participants have more internet experience compared to their demographic peers. Together, these findings lend tempered support for the generalizability of prior crowdsourced security and privacy user studies; provide context to more accurately interpret the results of such studies; and suggest rich directions for future work to mitigate experiencerather than demographic-related sample biases.
The COVID-19 global pandemic led governments, health agencies, and technology companies to work on solutions to minimize the spread of the disease. One such solution concerns contact-tracing apps whose utility is tied to widespread adoption. Using survey data collected a few weeks into lockdown measures in the United States, we explore Americans’ willingness to install a COVID-19 tracking app. Specifically, we evaluate how the distributor of such an app (e.g., government, health-protection agency, technology company) affects people’s willingness to adopt the tool. While we find that 67 percent of respondents are willing to install an app from at least one of the eight providers included, the factors that predict one’s willingness to adopt differ. Using Nissenbaum’s theory of privacy as contextual integrity, we explore differences in responses across distributors and discuss why some distributors may be viewed as less appropriate than others in the context of providing health-related apps during a global pandemic. We conclude the paper by providing policy recommendations for wide-scale data collection that minimizes the likelihood that such tools violate the norms of appropriate information flows.
Identifying security vulnerabilities in software is a critical task that requires significant human effort. Currently, vulnerability discovery is often the responsibility of software testers before release and white-hat hackers (often within bug bounty programs) afterward. This arrangement can be ad-hoc and far from ideal; for example, if testers could identify more vulnerabilities, software would be more secure at release time. Thus far, however, the processes used by each group -and how they compare to and interact with each other -have not been well studied. This paper takes a first step toward better understanding, and eventually improving, this ecosystem: we report on a semi-structured interview study (n=25) with both testers and hackers, focusing on how each group finds vulnerabilities, how they develop their skills, and the challenges they face. The results suggest that hackers and testers follow similar processes, but get different results due largely to differing experiences and therefore different underlying knowledge of security concepts. Based on these results, we provide recommendations to support improved security training for testers, better communication between hackers and developers, and smarter bug bounty policies to motivate hacker participation.1 The way people think and the perspectives and previous experiences they bring to bear on a problem [24, pg. 40-65].
An increasing number of data-driven decision aids are being developed to provide humans with advice to improve decision-making around important issues such as personal health and criminal justice. For algorithmic systems to support human decision-making effectively, people must be willing to use them. We expand upon prior research by empirically modeling how accuracy and privacy influence intent to adopt algorithmic systems, focusing on an globally-relevant decision context with tangible consequences: the COVID-19 pandemic. We analyze surveys of 4,615 Americans to (1) evaluate the effect of both accuracy and privacy concerns on reported willingness to install COVID-19 apps; (2) examine how different groups of users weigh accuracy relative to privacy; and (3) we empirically develop the first statistical models, to our knowledge, of how the amount of benefit (e.g., error rate) and degree of privacy risk in a data-driven decision aid may influence willingness to adopt.
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