The gold standard began to emerge as a universal monetary system in the late 1870s, and it had spread throughout the world economy by 1900. It was unusual for nations to be off the gold standard, and it meant that they were detached from the international financial community. Spain never joined the gold standard club in any of its varieties, either before or after 1914. Unlike the vast majority of the European currencies, the peseta's exchange rate fluctuated, sometimes widely, against gold and gold currencies. Gold convertibility was suspended in 1883 and never resumed. Nevertheless, the monetary authorities were aware that the Spanish economy, off the gold standard, was an outlier in the international economy and made plans to put the peseta on gold both before and after 1914.Why Spain never adopted the gold standard is a complex issue, and our paper offers a possible answer by examining the behaviour of an issuing bank that refused to accept, or resisted, its role as a central bank. Our study also provides a basis for a comparison between the Bank of Spain, some of its features and policies, with other peripheral issuing institutions. Moreover, our paper encompasses both the pre-war and the post-war periods, which allows us to present both the similarities and the differences in the exchange and monetary policies of the Spanish authorities during the era of the classical gold standard and the years of the gold exchange standard. Keywords AbstractThe gold standard began to emerge as a universal monetary system in the late 1870s, and it had spread throughout the world economy by 1900. It was unusual for nations to be off the gold standard, and it meant that they were detached from the international financial community. Spain never joined the gold standard club in any of its varieties, either before or after 1914. Unlike the vast majority of the European currencies, the peseta's exchange rate fluctuated, sometimes widely, against gold and gold currencies. Gold convertibility was suspended in 1883 and never resumed. Nevertheless, the monetary authorities were aware that the Spanish economy, off the gold standard, was an outlier in the international economy and made plans to put the peseta on gold both before and after 1914.Why Spain never adopted the gold standard is a complex issue, and our paper offers a possible answer by examining the behaviour of an issuing bank that refused to accept, or resisted, its role as a central bank. Our study also provides a basis for a comparison between the Bank of Spain, some of its features and policies, with other peripheral issuing institutions. Moreover, our paper encompasses both the pre-war and the post-war periods, which allows us to present both the similarities and the differences in the exchange and monetary policies of the Spanish authorities during the era of the classical gold standard and the years of the gold exchange standard.

This chapter analyses the contribution of the 1959 Plan de Estabilización (Stabilization Plan) to the economic changes that occurred in Spain during the 1960s. Economic growth improved in the 1950s after a decade of stagnation, but it was autarkic growth and the country accumulated serious imbalances. By reducing interventionism, initiating a process of liberalization and creating an appropriate economic framework, after two decades of autarky, the Plan contributed to promoting economic growth and helped change attitudes and mentalities. Moreover, the Plan had a long-term impact by allowing Spain to take advantage of a favourable international context during the 1960s.However, the dictatorship and its political interests restricted the scope of the reforms and negatively shaped the long-term evolution of Spanish economic development.

The outbreak of the financial crisis in 2007 has increased the interest in the study of financial history and, mainly, from compared studies on international financial crises. To this end, Investigaciones de Historia Económica-Economic History Research has set out to publish a special issue, welcoming the research on past financial crises into its pages. This issue consists of five papers, summarized in this introduction, that revolve around three large topics: the significance of sources and their use to understand the origin of financial crisis as well as their regulatory consequences; comparisons between major crises, and the study of financial crises' causes and the measures taken to rise to their challenges. The articles presented here delve into the lessons offered by past crises and provide a good example of Economic History's ability to contribute to a better understanding of past and present economic phenomena.

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