Pluralitas non est ponenda sine necessitate.
William of OckhamFor games with a measure space of players a tandem pair, consisting of a mixed and a pure Cournot-Nash equilibrium existence result, is presented. Their generality causes them to be completely mutually equivalent. This provides a unifying pair of Cournot-Nash existence results that goes considerably beyond the central result of 11, Theorem 2.1]. The versatility of this pair is demonstrated by the following new applications: (i) uni cation and generalization of the two equilibrium distribution existence results for anonymous games in 44], (ii) generalization of the equilibrium existence result for Bayesian di erential information games in 38], (iii) inclusion of the Bayesian Nash equilibrium existence results in 41, 6] for games with private information in the sense of Harsanyi 33].
A generalization is presented of the existence results for an optimal consumption problem of Aumann and Perles [4] and Cox and Huang [10]. In addition, we present a very general optimality principle.
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