This paper, by comparing three potential energy trading systems, studies the feasibility of integrating a community energy storage (CES) device with consumer-owned photovoltaic (PV) systems for demand-side management of a residential neighborhood area network. We consider a fully-competitive CES operator in a non-cooperative Stackelberg game, a benevolent CES operator that has socially favorable regulations with competitive users, and a centralized cooperative CES operator that minimizes the total community energy cost. The former two game-theoretic systems consider that the CES operator first maximizes their revenue by setting a price signal and trading energy with the grid. Then the users with PV panels play a non-cooperative repeated game following the actions of the CES operator to trade energy with the CES device and the grid to minimize energy costs. The centralized CES operator cooperates with the users to minimize the total community energy cost without appropriate incentives. The non-cooperative Stackelberg game with the fully-competitive CES operator has a unique Stackelberg equilibrium at which the CES operator maximizes revenue and users obtain unique Pareto-optimal Nash equilibrium CES energy trading strategies. Extensive simulations show that the fully-competitive CES model gives the best trade-off of operating environment between the CES operator and the users.Index Terms-Community energy storage, demand-side management, game theory, neighborhood area network.

This paper develops a novel energy trading system with a community energy storage (CES) device for demandside load management within a neighborhood area network. The energy users in the proposed system that have their own photovoltaic power generation are allowed to trade energy from their personal surplus with the grid and the CES device. We adopt a dynamic noncooperative repeated game with Paretoefficient pure strategies as the decentralized approach for the users to determine optimal energy trading amounts for the next day. This decentralized model needs minimal information exchange or communication between users. Simulation results show that our system is able to provide peak load leveling for the grid, while providing financial benefits to users. Moreover, the performance benefits of our system are robust to both inaccuracy in day-ahead power forecasts and CES battery inefficiencies.Index Terms-Community energy storage (CES), game theory, load management, microgrid, neighborhood area network, photovoltaic (PV) power generation. 1949-3053

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