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holds the Stephen A. Jarislowsky Distinguished Chair in Finance in the School of Business at the University of Alberta and is a research associate of the National Bureau of Economic Research. We are deeply grateful to Kofi Awusabo-Asare for coordinating our household survey and his numerous suggestions along the way. We are also grateful to the management of the Social Security and National Insurance Trust (SSNIT) Fund of Ghana for providing access to individual records; the team of research assistants, Yvonne Adjakloe, Eugene Darteh, and Kobina Esia-Donkoh for their superb field work; William Angko and Alex Larbie-Mensah for the painful task of collecting the SSNIT data; and Greatjoy Ndlovu and Panos Rigopoulos for excellent assistance with the data analysis. We thank participants at the National Bureau of Economic Research (NBER)/ Africa Project meetings in Cambridge and Zanzibar for their comments and gratefully acknowledge financial support from the NBER and the SSHRC. The views expressed here, however, are solely ours and do not reflect those of the NBER or the SSNIT. For acknowledgments, sources of research support, and disclosure of the authors' material financial relationships, if any, please see http:// www .nber .org/ chapters/ c13378.ack.

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The authors study the incentive effects of rematches in sports with an emphasis on professional boxing. If the difference between the boxers' abilities is sufficiently small, the authors find that a clause that stipulates that the winner of the fight is obliged to give the loser a rematch (i.e., a mandatory rematch clause) results in a higher aggregate effort compared to aggregate effort when the probability of a rematch depends on effort. This result sheds some light on the practice of offering mandatory rematch clauses to elite boxers. The authors also argue that their results apply to rivalries and rematches in other sporting events and contests.