The on-line and memory-based processing models of candidate evaluation can be better understood by incorporating the concepts of ambivalence and uncertainty, both as subjective feeling states and as objective properties of information. An experiment was designed to address three questions: What are the relationships between ambivalence and uncertainty? What are the informational foundations of subjective ambivalence and uncertainty, and to what extent are they rooted in on-line (time of exposure) and memory-based (time of judgment) processes? What are the consequences of ambivalence and uncertainty for candidate evaluation? The results suggest that (1) subjective uncertainty is more strongly rooted in information about the candidate than is subjective ambivalence; (2) subjective uncertainty and (to a lesser extent) ambivalence are associated with an increased propensity to engage in memory-based processing; and (3) subjective ambivalence and uncertainty result in more negative evaluations, particularly among less sophisticated people. These results suggest ways in which the on-line and memory-based models might productively be combined.

As states across the country have adopted term limits provisions for their state legislatures, political scientists have analyzed how mass unseatings of incumbents are affecting legislative composition, capacity, and activity. Yet this reform may impact legislatures not only directly through forced retirements, but also indirectly by changing the incentives to prospective candidates. Following hypotheses suggested by Fiorina (1994Fiorina ( , 1996, we argue that term limits have changed the incentive structure for typical Democratic candidates in some legislatures. This change in incentives has, in turn, affected the partisan composition of statehouses just as the professionalization movement affected incentives and partisan composition a generation ago. We provide quantitative evidence that supports Fiorina's conjectures about term limits, suggesting that the presence of term limits provisions even before they take effect creates an environment that is less attractive to Democratic candidates.

Examining congressional superdelegate endorsements in the 2008 Democratic presidential nomination, the authors show that changes in the political context affected the balance of factors in members’ decisions to endorse Clinton or Obama. Specifically, the national standing of the candidates became increasingly important—and local opinion less important—to Obama endorsements even as constituency views became a stronger influence over Clinton endorsements. The findings reveal how constituency considerations affect the elite endorsement choices that shape the presidential nominating process. In addition, the analysis highlights the ways in which members of Congress balance conflicting considerations in a changing political context when an issue plays out over an extended period.

Majority Party leaders are hypothesized, through their control of the legislative schedule in the House of Representatives, to use legislative success as a selective incentive to encourage majority party members to contribute to the collective goals of the party. Members can demonstrate party loyalty through floor voting and financial contributions to the party's re-election efforts. This article examines legislative success from the 103rd through 107th Congresses. The evidence shows that both demonstrations of party loyalty have a significant effect on legislative success.