Numerous studies showed decreased performance in situations that require multiple tasks or actions relative to appropriate control conditions. Because humans often engage in such multitasking activities, it is important to understand how multitasking affects performance. In the present article, we argue that research on dual-task interference and sequential task switching has proceeded largely separately using different experimental paradigms and methodology. In our article we aim at organizing this complex set of research in terms of three complementary research perspectives on human multitasking. One perspective refers to structural accounts in terms of cognitive bottlenecks (i.e., critical processing stages). A second perspective refers to cognitive flexibility in terms of the underlying cognitive control processes. A third perspective emphasizes cognitive plasticity in terms of the influence of practice on human multitasking abilities. With our review article we aimed at highlighting the value of an integrative position that goes beyond isolated consideration of a single theoretical research perspective and that broadens the focus from single experimental paradigms (dual task and task switching) to favor instead a view that emphasizes the fundamental similarity of the underlying cognitive mechanisms across multitasking paradigms. (PsycINFO Database Record

Autism spectrum disorder (ASD) is among other things characterized by specific impairments in emotion processing. It is not clear, however, to what extent the typical decline in affective functioning is related to the specific autistic traits. We employed The Autism Spectrum-Quotient (AQ) to quantify autistic traits in a group of 500 healthy individuals and investigate whether we could detect similar difficulties in the perception of emotional expressions in a broader autistic phenotype. The group with high AQ score was less accurate and needed higher emotional content to recognize emotions of anger, disgust, and sadness. Our findings demonstrate a selective impairment in identification of emotional facial expressions in healthy individuals that is primarily related to the extent of autistic traits.

This electroencephalographic (EEG) study investigated the impact of between-task competition on intentional control in voluntary task switching. Anticipatory preparation for an upcoming task switch is a hallmark of top-down intentional control. Meanwhile, asymmetries in performance and voluntary choice when switching between tasks differing in relative strength reveal the effects of between-task competition, reflected in a surprising bias against switching to an easier task. Here, we assessed the impact of this bias on EEG markers of intentional control during preparation for an upcoming task switch. The results revealed strong and varied effects of between-task competition on EEG markers of global task preparation—a frontal contingent negative variation (CNV), a posterior slow positive wave, and oscillatory activity in the alpha band (8–12 Hz) over posterior scalp sites. In contrast, we observed no between-task differences in motor-specific task preparation, as indexed by the lateralized readiness potential and by motor-related amplitude asymmetries in the mu (9–13 Hz) and beta (18–26 Hz) frequency bands. Collectively, these findings demonstrate that between-task competition directly influences the formation of top-down intentions, not only their expression in overt behavior. Specifically, this influence occurs at the level of global task intention rather than the preparation of specific actions.

Problems with cognitive control in both autism and dyslexia have already been reported in different studies. The present study specifically examined task-switching performance in children with autism and dyslexia. For this purpose, a multiple-trial paradigm was used with cues for colour- and shape-matching tasks presented before a run of trials. The cue could imply a task switch (when the cue changed the task) or a task repetition (when the cue did not change the task). Both reaction times and error rates were measured for switching, restarting, and general task performance. Participants were children with autism (24) and with dyslexia (25) and healthy controls (27) with normal IQ and ages from 12 to 18 years. The main finding was that while similar switching performance was observed between children with autism and the healthy controls, children with dyslexia showed a significant switch-specific delay relative to both healthy controls and children with autism. Furthermore, no deficit in restarting performance was observed for any of the two patient groups. Finally, additional evidence is provided for a more general deficit in information processing in dyslexia. Our data suggest that children with autism are able to switch between tasks in a similar way as do normally developing children as long as the tasks are unambiguously specified. Furthermore, the data imply switch-specific deficits in dyslexia additionally to the deficits in general information processing already reported in the literature. The implications of our data are further discussed in relation to the interpretation of the Wisconsin Card Sorting Test.

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Three experiments investigated the cognitive mechanisms underlying the restart cost and mixing cost in task switching. To this aim, the predictability of task order was varied (unpredictable in Experiment 1 and predictable in Experiments 2 and 3) across experiments, which employed a multiple-trial paradigm. Verbal cues for color and shape matching tasks were presented before a run of four trials. Focusing on task-repetition runs only, we measured restart cost as the diVerence in performance between trials 1 and 2 and mixing cost as the diVerence in performance on the non-cued trials under mixed-tasks conditions (Experiments 1 and 2) and single-task conditions (Experiment 3). The restart cost was observed under mixed-tasks conditions with both unpredictable and predictable task orders but not under the single-task condition. In contrast, the mixing cost was observed under the mixed-tasks condition with unpredictable task order only (Experiment 1). This Wnding implies that the optimal task execution on repetition trials depends on how predictable the identity of the approaching task is. Therefore, we suggest that mixing cost arises from limited preparation on repetition trials when task order is unpredictable, while restart cost arises from processes involved in cue-based task activation that is needed to resolve task interference. Together, these data suggest that restart cost and mixing cost are based on dissociable mechanisms.

Impairments in cognitive control generating deviant adaptive cognition have been proposed to account for the strong preference for repetitive behavior in autism. We examined if this preference reflects intentional deficits rather than problems in task execution in the broader autism phenotype using the Autism-Spectrum Quotient (AQ). Participants chose between two tasks differing in their relative strength by indicating first their voluntary task choice and then responding to the subsequently presented stimulus. We observed a stronger repetition bias for the harder task in high AQ participants, with no other differences between the two groups. These findings indicate that the interference between competing tasks significantly contributes to repetitive behavior in autism by modulating the formation of task intentions when choosing tasks voluntarily.

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