Standard-Nutzungsbedingungen:Die Dokumente auf EconStor dürfen zu eigenen wissenschaftlichen Zwecken und zum Privatgebrauch gespeichert und kopiert werden.Sie dürfen die Dokumente nicht für öffentliche oder kommerzielle Zwecke vervielfältigen, öffentlich ausstellen, öffentlich zugänglich machen, vertreiben oder anderweitig nutzen.Sofern die Verfasser die Dokumente unter Open-Content-Lizenzen (insbesondere CC-Lizenzen) zur Verfügung gestellt haben sollten, gelten abweichend von diesen Nutzungsbedingungen die in der dort genannten Lizenz gewährten Nutzungsrechte. Terms of use: Documents in Transfer Fee Regulations in European FootballEberhard Feess Gerd Muehlheusser The Institute for the Study of Labor (IZA) in Bonn is a local and virtual international research center and a place of communication between science, politics and business. IZA is an independent, nonprofit limited liability company (Gesellschaft mit beschränkter Haftung) supported by the Deutsche Post AG. The center is associated with the University of Bonn and offers a stimulating research environment through its research networks, research support, and visitors and doctoral programs. IZA engages in (i) original and internationally competitive research in all fields of labor economics, (ii) development of policy concepts, and (iii) dissemination of research results and concepts to the interested public. The current research program deals with (1) mobility and flexibility of labor, (2) internationalization of labor markets, (3) the welfare state and labor markets, (4) labor markets in transition countries, (5) the future of labor, (6) evaluation of labor market policies and projects and (7) general labor economics. D I S C U S S I O N P A P E R S E R I E SIZA Discussion Papers often represent preliminary work and are circulated to encourage discussion. Citation of such a paper should account for its provisional character. A revised version may be available on the IZA website (www.iza.org) or directly from the author. We analyze the impact of three different transfer fee systems on payoffs, contract lengths, training and effort incentives in European football. The different regimes, being used until 1995 ("Pre-Bosman" or P), currently in use ("Bosman" or B), and recently approved ("Monti" or M) differ with respect to the transfer fee an initial club must accept in case of a transfer depending on whether a player has a valid contract or not. We show that the different systems differ only with respect to the contract length if the contract which maximizes the expected joint surplus of the initial club and the player is feasible under each system. Otherwise, regime P is strictly dominated by regime B in terms of expected social welfare. Regime M leads to higher effort but lower incentives to invest in training compared to system B.JEL Classification: J41, K12, L83

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all-pay auctions, contests, asymmetric allocation rule, rent-seeking games, asymmetric information, D44, D88,

Summary With data from the last available wave of the World Values Survey, we analyze the impact of different religions and the degree of religiosity on the work ethic of respondents. Following the theoretical literature, we predict that religiosity has a positive effect on work ethic for all religions (Hypothesis 1), that there is no significant difference in the work ethic of individuals from different religions (Hypothesis 2), and that the impact of religiosity on work ethic is lower for Protestants than for Catholics (Hypothesis 3). Due to the data structure, we apply a Multilevel Random Coefficient Model to test our hypotheses. While our data strongly support the first and the third hypothesis, the second hypothesis is only partially confirmed as Muslims report higher work ethic than individuals with other religions. We provide additional insights for the latter finding by disaggregating the data set by continents and levels of GDP per capita.

We extend the theoretical literature on the impact of malpractice liability by allowing for two treatment technologies, a safe and a risky one. The safe technology bears no failure risk, but leads to patient-specific disutility since it cannot completely solve the health problems. By contrast, the risky technology (for instance a surgery) may entirely cure patients, but fail with some probability depending on the hospital's care level. Tight malpractice liability increases care levels if the risky technology is chosen at all, but also leads to excessively high incentives for avoiding the liability exposure by adopting the safe technology. We refer to this distortion toward the safe technology as negative defensive medicine. Taking the problem of negative defensive medicine seriously, the second best optimal liability needs to balance between the over-incentive for the safe technology in case of tough liability and the incentive to adopt little care for the risky technology in case of weak liability. In a model with errors in court, we find that gross negligence where hospitals are held liable only for very low care levels outperforms standard negligence, even though standard negligence would implement the first best efficient care level.

We extend the analysis of self-reporting schemes to criminal teams. When the violators behave non-cooperatively, maximum deterrence can be reached at virtually no cost by designing a prisoners' dilemma. One drawback of such a scheme is that it might induce cooperative behaviour in the self-reporting stage. If the cooperation rate is increasing the benefits from cooperation, it is optimal to impose less than the maximum fine if both individuals self-report. The same result occurs for imperfect self-reporting technologies where the conviction of one agent does not necessarily lead to a conviction of his accomplice.

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We employ a model of n heterogenous profit-maximizing clubs to analyze the impact of revenue sharing in a professional sports league. Individual revenues depend on both talent demand and competitive balance. We identify three effects of revenue sharing. The revenue effect reduces talent demand of each club because a part of the revenues is generated by competitors. The asymmetric cost effect supports the first effect, and is even stronger for weak clubs. The competitive balance effect makes clubs more sensitive to competitive balance. We show that the asymmetric cost effect unambiguously dominates the competitive balance effect so that revenue sharing decreases both talent demand and competitive balance, and thereby aggregate profits and social welfare.