The essay reviews developments of the Core-Periphery paradigm. Two variants of the paradigm are isolated. Both variants define core-periphery relations by three features: characteristics distinguishing core from periphery, the goods exchanged, and the nature of the exchange and the pattern of core-periphery relations. These features form the explanatory variables in the examination of three central problems in social science: the rise of the state, the development of imperialism and colonialism and regional social movements. However, the distinguishing feature of core-periphery analysis is the spatial representation of these dynamics. Yet spatial representations in core-periphery paradigms are latent and poorly developed. Several alternative spatial representations are more effective in displaying core-periphery dynamics, permitting simpler assumptions, introducing temporal dynamics and multi-linear models.

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Market models of politics are derived from economic theory where they were advanced in an age of political corruption to achieve four objectives: discipline, universality, liberty and unity in society; only later were such models imported into political discourse. The most pure form of the market model of politics is found in the vote maximization model; yet as a model for political parties and elections, the realism of its assumptions often is held inadequate. While more realistic assumptions generate the vote production model of party strategy, this model rapidly degenerates into the lazy monopolist model which contradicts the role of parties in democracy. The origins of these problems lie in the contradictions within the market ordering principle. Despite these underlying contradictions, market models of politics and parties have gained increasing acceptance both among intellectuals and the general public with numerous implications for the politics of liberal democracies.

T he origins of fascism remain a major concern to social scientists. Because fascism emerged in societies seeking transitions to democracy, a better understanding of these failed attempts at democratic transitions improves our understanding of both democracy's possibilities and the strengths and weakness of democratic theory. Indeed, theoretical arguments employed to explain fascism have their analogues in theories of democracy. Three arguments have been advanced to explain both democracy and fascism: class, civil society, and rational choice. This research examines the rise of fascism in Italy, 1919-21. The evidence contradicts the class theory of fascism and offers mixed evidence for the civil society theory, while supporting the rational choice theory.Fascism will always be a minority movement. It cannot move beyond the cities.Mussolini (1919) W hat social and economic conditions foster successful transitions to democracy, or conversely, in what circumstances do democratic transitions fail? Social science theory has long held that these questions represent two sides of the same coin: The conditions supporting democracy are found lacking where nondemocratic politics succeeds. For example, civil society theorists tie democracy to a robust civil society, and, using the obverse argument, theorists of fascism cite links between a weak civil society and the rise of fascism. Parallels exist for the class and rational choice theories of democracy and fascism. Thus, the theoretical arguments employed to explain fascism have their analogues in theories of democracy. These three theories-class, civil society, and rational choice-may explain the rise of Italian Fascism, 1919-21, but a fuller understanding of the explanations requires a clear statement of the hypotheses and the construction of adequate measures. E.