In the past 30 years researchers have examined the impact of heightened stress on the fidelity of eyewitness memory. Meta-analyses were conducted on 27 independent tests of the effects of heightened stress on eyewitness identification of the perpetrator or target person and separately on 36 tests of eyewitness recall of details associated with the crime. There was considerable support for the hypothesis that high levels of stress negatively impact both types of eyewitness memory. Meta-analytic Z-scores, whether unweighted or weighted by sample size, ranged from −5.40 to −6.44 (high stress condition-low stress condition). The overall effect sizes were −.31 for both proportion of correct identifications and accuracy of eyewitness recall. Effect sizes were notably larger for target-present than for target-absent lineups, for eyewitness identification studies than for face recognition studies and for eyewitness studies employing a staged crime than for eyewitness studies employing other means to induce stress.

The fidelity of an eyewitness's memory representation is an issue of paramount forensic concern. Psychological science has been unable to offer more than vague generalities concerning the relation of retention interval to memory trace strength for the once-seen face. A meta-analysis of 53 facial memory studies produced a highly reliable association (r=.18, d=0.37) between longer retention intervals and positive forgetting of once-seen faces, an effect equally strong for both face recognition and eyewitness identification studies. W. A. Wickelgren's (1974, 1975, 1977) theory of recognition memory provided statistically satisfactory fits to 11 different empirical forgetting functions. Applied to the results of field studies of eyewitness memory, the theory yields predictions relevant to fact finders' evaluations of eyewitness credibility. A plausible upper limit for witness initial memory strength corresponds to a probability of .67 of being correct on a fair six-person lineup. Furthermore, not only can the percentage of remaining memory strength be determined for any retention interval, but this strength estimate can be translated into an estimated probability of being correct on a fair lineup of a specified size.

Due to its comprehensive and cost-saving design, hospice has become a critical component of health care. Physicians have become the primary gatekeepers to information on hospice and sources of referral to hospice. However, many physicians do not discuss hospice options until late in the disease course, when patients and their families are no longer able to benefit from hospice services. Although physicians, as well as patients and hospice personnel, cite patient and hospice structure factors as barriers, the present article will focus on barriers physicians have more control over, such as their discomfort discussing terminality and fear of losing contact with patients. Focusing on the American hospice model, the present article will review past findings, examine gaps in the research, and propose systematic ways to discern whether the factors physicians claim are barriers actually affect their decision making about hospice referral.

In the present study, we conducted two separate meta-analyses in order to quantify the influence on facial identification accuracy of two variables related to initial memory strength for an unfamiliar face, specifically, length of exposure at the time of encounter and encoding operations as manipulated via stimulus processing instructions. Proportion correct was significantly higher for longer (M 0 0.66) as compared to shorter exposure durations (M 0 0.53) and when participants made social judgments of faces (M 0 0.75) than when they attended to individual facial features (M 0 0.71). The effect of increased exposure time was non-linear, with comparable increases exerting a greater effect for relatively short versus relatively long exposures. Neither substantive nor methodological variables were found to moderate the effect of exposure duration, and only date of publication appeared to moderate the effect of encoding operations. Theoretical and practical implications of the findings are discussed.

Civil jury instructions are inconsistent in defining what constitutes noneconomic damages, which may include pain, suffering, disability, disfigurement, and loss of enjoyment of life (LEL), among other injury sequelae. This inconsistency has been manifested recently in court decisions that have considered whether LEL should be treated as a separate element of noneconomic damages, distinct from pain and suffering. This paper reviews the case law on this issue and also describes a jury simulation experiment. Mock jurors awarded damages after they received instructions on noneconomic damages in which LEL was ( 1) not identified as a distinct element of damages; (2) defined as an element of damages distinct from pain and suffering, but participants awarded a single amount for noneconomic damages; or (3) defined as a distinct element of damages, and participants awarded separate amounts for LEL and pain and suffering. Instructions about LEL resulted in larger awards, but only when mock jurors also made a separate award for that element of damages.