BackgroundReducing the Strength is an increasingly popular intervention in which local authorities ask retailers to stop selling ‘super-strength’ beers and ciders. The intervention cannot affect alcohol availability, nor consumption, unless retailers participate. In this paper, we ask whether and why retailers choose or refuse to self-impose restrictions on alcohol sales in this way.MethodsMixed method assessment of retailers’ participation in Reducing the Strength in two London (UK) local authorities. Compliance rates and the cheapest available unit of alcohol at each store were assessed. Qualitative interviews with retailer managers and staff (n = 39) explored attitudes towards the intervention and perceptions of its impacts.ResultsShops selling super-strength across both areas fell from 78 to 25 (18 % of all off-licences). The median price of the cheapest unit of alcohol available across all retailers increased from £0.29 to £0.33 and in shops that participated in Reducing the Strength it rose from £0.33 to £0.43. The project received a mixed response from retailers. Retailers said they participated to deter disruptive customers, reduce neighbourhood disruptions and to maintain a good relationship with the local authority. Reducing the Strength participants and non-participants expressed concern about its perceived financial impact due to customers shopping elsewhere for super-strength. Some felt that customers’ ability to circumvent the intervention would limit its effectiveness and that a larger scale compulsory approach would be more effective.ConclusionsReducing the Strength can achieve high rates of voluntary compliance, reduce availability of super-strength and raise the price of the cheapest available unit of alcohol in participating shops. Questions remain over the extent to which voluntary interventions of this type can achieve wider social or health goals if non-participating shops attract customers from those who participate.

ijs. 6d. This book will commend itself to everyone who is interested in an objective appraisal of the subject. The tone of the whole book is set by the author in his foreword where, with becoming modesty, he gives credit to others but takes responsibility on himself. The finished product is largely the result of teamwork, however, by experts who are so well acquainted with their own particular subjects that it is probably a case of well placed confidence rather than of the touching faith which Mr. Colchester has in his contributors.

The following contributions are selected from contributions to the discussion on Wing Commander E. J. Dickie's paper ‘The Effective Use of Airspace’. The paper was presented at an Institute meeting held in the Royal Geographical Society's house on 21 March, and is printed in the last number of the Journal.I remember on many occasions in my Service experience undertaking cross-country flights with a large number of other aircraft flying along exactly the same route at almost precisely the same time. These were usually navigation training flights and, therefore, to some extent the errors which arose might not be held to be representative of what one would expect to happen to seasoned airline operators. Nevertheless, it was a commonplace to find on such occasions, very shortly after taking off, that all aircraft became so scattered as often to disappear from each other's view completely. And yet, at each turning point and again at the destination they all arrived at the same time. I am sure that there is something to learn from this particular aspect of flight along identical or parallel tracks. I do not think a simple fore-and-aft radar indicator would provide the safety in flight which we are anxious to establish. I believe that a secondary radar, giving an all-round horizontal view, would probably go a long way to meet the stated requirement; although, of course, only one giving a spherical view could give 100 per cent safety. Even with pilots who can see exactly where they are going, along clearly defined tracks over country abounding in natural navigational aids, it is true to say that the really effective variable is the track and not the timing. This lateral scatter is due to inaccurate steering data and to the many other inaccuracies affecting the actual path of an aircraft through the air, quite apart from wind-finding errors. Even with the best primary navigational aids, tracks cannot be flown with absolute precision. It follows that collisions are at least as likely to arise from errors of track as from errors of timing. So I would suggest that what we really need is a secondary radar which will give us an all-round horizontal view and I think that we must not delude ourselves into thinking that even the finest primary navigation aid will provide an accuracy in the air by which all aircraft proceeding along one route will remain only fore-and-aft of each other.

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