Abstract:The concept of quasi-perfect equilibria for games in extensive form is introduced. It is shown that a proper equilibrium of a normal form game induces a quasi-perfect equilibrium in every extensive form game having this normal form.

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We compare communication about private information to communication about actions in a oneshot 2-person public good game with private information. The informed player, who knows the exact return from contributing and whose contribution is unobserved, can send a message about the return or her contribution. Theoretically, messages can elicit the uninformed player's contribution, and allow the informed player to free-ride. The exact language used is not expected to matter. Experimentally, however, we find that free-ride depends on the language: the informed player freerides less-and thereby lies less frequently-when she talks about her contribution than when she talks about the return. Further experimental evidence indicates that it is the promise component in messages about the contribution that leads to less free-ride and less lying. (JEL: E21, E12)

We describe the evolution of the structure of the Dutch electricity market since the E-Act 1998 that implemented the first EU Electricity Directive. The initial idea of the government was to combine liberalization in supply with concentration in generation, with the attempt to create a national champion that could compete on the European market. As the producers could not agree, the attempt failed and competition could develop. The production side now is less concentrated than in several other EU countries and the competition authority has played an active role in keeping it that way, among others by means of its intelligent analysis of the Nuon-Reliant merger, in which a VPP auction was proposed as a remedy. In contrast, regulation of the network business cannot be considered a success as bad drafting of the law prevented effective incentive regulation. Finally, the liberalization of the retail market for green energy, in effect since July 2001, has shown that retail competition may not yield many consumer benefits.