fax 01-972-952-9435.References at the end of the paper. AbstractIn 1997, Statoil and Halliburton Energy Services, Inc. began jointly evaluating technologies that could be used to develop a revolutionary coiled-tubing and well-intervention system. This system, which will be deployed initially in the Norwegian sector of the North Sea, sets a new standard for drilling with conventional drilling rigs or coiled-tubing drilling units. The advanced well-construction system consists of a digitally controlled and automated coiled-tubing drilling system that uses a new advanced composite coiled tubing (ACCT) with embedded wires and a tractor-driven bottomhole assembly (BHA). This system enables the geological steering of complex, extended-reach wellpaths that were not previously achievable.This paper discusses a joint development project in which the operator and the service company worked together to design a fit-for-purpose system that met Norways stringent health, safety, and environment (HSE) requirements. The systems three major subsystems are discussed: the digitally controlled and automated surface equipment, the 2 7 /8-in. ACCT with embedded wires, and the drilling and intervention BHA. Test results from qualification and pilot wells are also included.
Summary Many oilfield companies require field crews to systematically analyze safety aspects of their activities before starting work. Most commonly this process is called a job safety analysis, or JSA. Recent developments in measuring safety performance have changed the JSA process by better defining its function, as explained in this paper. This change provides major improvements and is rapidly gaining acceptance throughout the Gulf of Mexico petroleum industry. An informal survey of Gulf of Mexico offshore production facilities and drilling rigs showed that JSAs tend to be viewed as a tedious formality that crews comply with only because they are required to do so. For a typical jackup drilling rig, adopting the new JSA process and its standards can reduce the total time spent in JSA meetings from approximately 30 man-hours per day to fewer than 4 man-hours per day. In general, work crews enthusiastically approve of the new style of JSA because of the time savings and because it clarifies key responsibilities. Where conventional JSAs simply identify things that should happen, the new style causes things to happen, and the result is a considerable reduction in the likelihood of accidents. Introduction Major oil companies often require their own employees, and most contractors, to use a JSA process (although the process is sometimes referred to by another name). The crux of the idea is that crews hold a meeting before beginning any job, analyze the job, and decide what they can do to prevent accidents during the job. While visiting rigs, production facilities, construction sites, and other work areas, a considerable difference between perception of implementation and the actual implementation of JSAs was noted. For example, on one location the noise level was so high outside the offices and quarters that everyone had to wear hearing protection. The crew gathered and the supervisor read a JSA while the crew members stood, unable to hear any of the JSA information. The crew then completed the job and the supervisor filed a report stating that a JSA was conducted according to the requirements of the company policy. It was no surprise to find the crew was privately scoffing at the JSA process and viewed it as bureaucratic excessiveness. Company health, safety, and environmental departments often believe the JSA process is being followed and accepted scrupulously by work crews; they may even identify records and testimonies that support that conclusion, as in the example above. However, objective observers who spend enough time with a work crew to gain their confidence often find people privately confessing they see no benefit in the JSA process and generally consider it a required-but-meaningless formality. This situation is common throughout the industry: management sends out strongly worded orders that a JSA must be conducted and they get back reports that the order was followed, but what actually happens has little or no effect on the probability of accidents. Because of this, it was necessary to develop a better way to accurately gauge the effectiveness of a JSA program. A JSA is valuable only if it prevents accidents, but even without a JSA, most jobs would not result in an accident. That makes it hard to determine if the JSA made a real difference. The problem is amplified by official or unofficial programs that encourage employees to hide accidents or to change their records. In many instances, accident reports are distorted to make the occurrence of accidents seem less frequent than they really are. How, then, can management better determine whether a given accident report decreased the chances of that particular accident occurring again? How, then, can we prove that a JSA actually decreased the chances of accidents occurring? Effective JSAs produce the same corrective actions produced by a good accident report. The only difference is that the JSA determines the corrective action before, rather than after, the accident occurs. Therefore, the effectiveness of a JSA can be measured by the exact process used to measure the effectiveness of corrective actions in accident reports (Veley 2002). This means that an effective JSA is a plan, or a prearranged schedule of events leading to a particular objective. To meet theis definition, a JSA must produce specific things to do that will become corrective actions when they are assigned.
TX 75083-3836, U.S.A., fax 01-972-952-9435. ProposalSafety performance is an increasingly important factor in deciding which bidders get contracts. Companies also make safety performance an important element in selecting employees for promotion, or for termination. The stakes are high, and it is critical that safety performance measurements accurately reflect probability of future accidents.Conventional measurements are proving to be unreliable indicators of the future and can cause contracts to go to bidders with the highest, not lowest, probability of accidents. They punish supervisors and companies for things they cannot control. Additionally, they can unfairly derail the careers of capable employees at all levels. This new system rewards supervisors based on corrective actions entirely within their control. It receives strong approval from all management levels, and is proving much more effective in preventing accidents. Now, a new metric is available that eliminates these problems. It is based on a simple, objective, highly reliable system of evaluating corrective actions. This new system generates a single number directly indexed to future safety performance. The system eliminates problems with conventional frequency and severity ratios, and it is proving to be a powerful management tool in many ways. It is currently being tested and implemented by large and small companies throughout all of the industry.
fax 01-972-952-9435. AbstractHigh-pressure, coiled-tubing, jet-cleaning technology provided a Mobile Bay operator with a viable option to remove downhole scale and debris efficiently without adversely affecting the formation, the environment, or the well-completion tubulars. This paper will provide a complete and detailed discussion of the surface and downhole equipment needed to perform the high-pressure cleaning application. The paper also provides an overview of the computer simulations created to predict coiledtubing stresses accurately and the equipment used to collect real-time data on coiled-tubing fatigue, applied pump and hydraulic pressures, tubing drag and buckling parameters, cleaning fluid characteristics, and high-pressure nozzIe design.Historically, well-intervention alternatives have been limited in the deep-sour environment of the Mobile Bay field, which lies off the coast of Alabama in the Gulf of Mexico. Such factors as the sour-gas environment, the great depth of the formations (-22,000 ft), the excessive bottomholetemperature (>400°), the high wellhead pressure (>5,000 psi), and stringent environmen-talreguIations, present adverse conditions that challenge the use of conventional well-intervention and workover technology.Recently, a Mobile Bay operator experienced barium-scaling problems in a deep well (22,000 t?) (Fig. 1). A conventional workover risked formation damage as a consequence of killing the well, and damage to the well's expensive exotic alloy completion tubulars during the pulling and reinstallation process. Conventional rig mobilization and day rates were also prohibitive, as were the associated environmental issues inherent in Mobile Bay operations.
Proposal Many oilfield companies require field crews to systematically analyze safety aspects of their activities before starting to work. Commonly, this process is called a Job Safety Analysis, or JSA, but other labels are also used. Recent developments in measuring safety performance have changed the JSA process by redefining its objective. This change is definitely for the better, and it is rapidly gaining acceptance throughout the Gulf of Mexico petroleum industry. A survey of Gulf of Mexico offshore production facilities and drilling rigs showed that JSAs tend to be a tedious formality that crews comply with only because they are required to do so. For a typical jack-up drilling rig, adopting this new JSA process and standard can reduce total time spent in JSA meetings from approximately 30 man-hours per day to less than four man-hours per day. Not only does the new style of JSA provide significant time savings, but it is considerably more effective in reducing the likelihood of accidents, meets with enthusiastic approval of work crews, and provides a powerful tool for onsite management. Introduction Major oil companies often require their own employees and most contractors to use a JSA process, although the process occasionally goes by some other name. The crux of the idea is that crews hold a meeting before beginning any job, analyze the job, and decide what they can do to prevent accidents during the job. While visiting rigs, production facilities, construction sites, and other work areas, the authors have frequently noted a considerable difference between perception and reality in regard to JSAs. Company HSE departments often believe the JSA process is being scrupulously followed and is accepted by work crews. They may point to records and testimonies that support that conclusion. However, outsiders who spend enough time with a work crew to gain their confidence find people privately confessing they see no benefit in the JSA process and generally consider it a required but meaningless formality. On one location, the noise level was so high that everyone wore hearing protection outside offices and quarters. The crews would gather, the supervisor would read a JSA while everyone stood there unable to hear a single word. The crew then did the job, and the supervisor filed a report that a JSA was conducted as required by company policy. It was no surprise to find the crews were privately scoffing at the JSA process and viewed it a just bureaucratic harrassment. This situation seems to be common throughout all industry. Management sends out strongly worded orders that a JSA will be conducted, and they get back reports that the order was obeyed, but what actually happens has little or no effect on the probability of accidents occurring. A better way is needed for gauging effectiveness of a JSA program. A JSA is valuable only to the extent to which it prevents accidents. When JSAs are employed, most jobs do not result in an accident. However, accidents are rare, so chances are good that even without a JSA or other prejob safety analysis, most jobs would still not result in an accident. How can we prove any given JSA actually decreased the chances of accidents occurring? This issue also applies when deciding whether a given accident report decreased chances of that particular accident repeating. The problem of determining the effectiveness of these tools is amplified by official or unofficial programs that encourage people to hide accidents or distort records. The authors believe an effective JSA should produce the same corrective action that would be produced by a good accident report. The only difference is that the JSA devises the corrective action before, rather than after, the accident occurs. Therefore, effectiveness of a JSA can be measured by exactly the same process used to measure the effectiveness of corrective actions in accident reports.1 That means an effective JSA should be a plan, or a pre-arranged schedule of events leading to attaining some objective. To meet this definition, a plan must contain actions (events) that will be pre-arranged when when they are assigned.
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