Objective The objective of this study is to address the following question: Why has the United States been so reluctant to embrace the type of comprehensive gun control that is in place in every other developed democracy? Method The method used to address this question is a computerized content analysis on nearly 18 million words that were extracted from online political discussions of Canadian and American gun enthusiasts. A comparison of these discussions was guided by three theories on the character and origins of Canadian–American political difference. Results The results demonstrate that the instrumental components of gun ownership are more relevant for Canadian gun enthusiasts, while American gun enthusiasts view their arms as physical manifestations of political values. These values are consistent with a widely perceived American ideology that centers on individual freedom and antipathy toward government. Conclusion This leads to the conclusion that U.S. gun rights groups are naturally advantaged in the gun control debate because their rhetoric finds fertile soil beyond the gun enthusiast segment, and helps explain the intensity of their opposition to gun control.

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Are the components of policy ideology in the American states fixed, or do they change over time? We document a change in the ideological loading and internal consistency of state firearms laws. While state policy liberalism has long correlated positively with restrictive gun regulation, this relationship strengthened over the 1986‐2016 period. Moreover, states' gun policy regimes have become more internally consistent since 1986, and newly salient issues, such as concealed‐carry laws and assault weapons bans, have been enfolded into the existing dimension of regulatory restrictiveness. This process also corresponds to a shift in the geographic bases of the Republican and Democratic Parties toward nonurban and urban areas, respectively. The changes in gun policy patterns across states reflect dynamic representation of voter ideology. The results suggest that certain modeling assumptions used to generate cardinal state policy ideology scores in prior research ought to be revised. Related Articles Joslyn, Mark R., and Donald P. Haider‐Markel. 2018. “Motivated Innumeracy: Estimating the Size of the Gun Owner Population and Its Consequences for Opposition to Gun Restrictions.” Politics & Policy 46 (6): 827‐850. https://doi.org/10.1111/polp.12276 Smith‐Walter, Aaron, Holly L. Peterson, Michael D. Jones, and Ashley Nicole Reynolds Marshall. 2016. “Gun Stories: How Evidence Shapes Firearm Policy in the United States.” Politics & Policy 44 (6): 1053‐1088. https://doi.org/10.1111/polp.12187 Tucker, Justin A., James W. Stoutenborough, and R. Matthew Beverlin. 2012. “Geographic Proximity in the Diffusion of Concealed Weapons Permit Laws.” Politics & Policy 40 (6): 1081‐1105. https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1747-1346.2012.00399.x

The weakness of the antigun lobby in the United States is attributed to the "collective action problem" of trying to mobilize "free riders" behind a public purpose. But the Coalition for Gun Control emerged in Canada to successfully lobby for the Firearms Act of 1995. If the "collective action problem" is not limited to the United States, then are its effects "mediated" by political culture? To address this research question, we content analyze (1) media coverage, (2) party platforms, (3) presidential, and (4) ministerial rhetoric. Three frames represent "restrictive" gun policies that ban or regulate firearms, "punitive" gun policies that penalize the person for the unlawful use of firearms, or "lenient" gun policies that encourage gun ownership and gun rights. Marked differences in framing the gun debate help explain why an antigun coalition emerged in Canada but not the United States.

British financial interests in China, since 1895, had been closely linked with political and strategic considerations. As the political and financial rivalry between the European powers intensified, the link tightened, becoming increasingly essential for mutual preservation. European finance meant railways, mineral rights, arms, and support for the ailing Manchu Dynasty; it was clear to successive British governments that British political supremacy in China could not survive the passing of such important financial concessions into foreign hands. In 1898, with the international scramble for concessions at its peak, the leading representatives of British finance in China co-operated fully with the Foreign Office to gain the bulk of Chinese railway contracts and concessions. Such respectable British enterprises as the British and Chinese Corporation and the Pekin Syndicate received active diplomatic support at Peking and the encouragement of the Foreign Office in London. Short of actually negotiating financial contracts on behalf of private companies British diplomacy could do little more to improve the competitive standing of these leading British firms vis-à-vis their foreign rivals.

It was often difficult in the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries to distinguish the interests of European financiers and concession holders operating overseas from the political policies of their respective governments. Concessions from a weak regime, in regions where political disorder and economic hardship were apparent, gave the power which held them a basis for the development of political influence in the country; and a basis too for an exclusive sphere of economic enterprise or, in the event of a total disintegration of the native administration, for a sphere of political influence which might follow a general partition among the European powers. In this context, railway enterprise was especially important. Railways promoted trade, and they could bring prosperity and progress to the areas through which they passed. They allowed military mobility too; and could be thus offensive or defensive instruments to be manipulated in accordance with economic and strategic interests.

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This article examines the governance regimes that have developed around a neglected but significant type of cross-border institution: the organizations that manage and operate the physical infrastructure that links Canada with the United States across a water border. On land border crossings, no shared infrastructure that must be jointly managed and maintained is required. However, along the 3538 km of the southern Canada–northern United States border (55 per cent of the entire border) that is formed by a waterway (lake or river), some jointly managed physical infrastructure is necessary to link the countries. There are a total of 25 vehicular bridges or tunnels that provide a physical connection across this water border, and these include the busiest crossing points along the entire border in terms of both freight (where Detroit/Windsor leads the way) and passenger traffic (which is heaviest at the Niagara crossings). The successful management of these physical infrastructure resources is of great importance to both countries, and many of these cross-border facilities have become potent symbols of cross-national comity. Though arguably the challenges facing border facility operators are generally similar along the Canada–United States water border, a wide variety of models for the management and governance of shared bridges and tunnels have emerged. This article relies on semi-structured interviews with facility managers and executives within seven border crossing governance regimes (accounting for a total of 18 separate border crossing facilities) and focuses primarily on those spanning the Maine–New Brunswick , New York–Ontario, and Michigan-Ontario borders. Through published descriptions of the formal structures and the interviews, we examine the ways in which interests and perspectives from the two sides of the border are accommodated in the diverse governance regimes of these facilities. We also explore the various responses of facility operators to the challenges posed by the binational context; the impact of securitization and new border crossing requirements; and the facility’s role in fostering cross-border relationships at the community level. From this, it is clear that border facilities are generally well operated and responsive to their mission. However, we are able to document some enduring challenges faced by the operators of border infrastructure. These constrain the performance of these facilities in significant ways.