Background The COVID-19 pandemic is a global health crisis, yet certain countries have had far more success in limiting COVID-19 cases and deaths. We suggest that collective threats require a tremendous amount of coordination, and that strict adherence to social norms is a key mechanism that enables groups to do so. Here we examine how the strength of social norms—or cultural tightness–looseness—was associated with countries' success in limiting cases and deaths by October, 2020. We expected that tight cultures, which have strict norms and punishments for deviance, would have fewer cases and deaths per million as compared with loose cultures, which have weaker norms and are more permissive. Methods We estimated the relationship between cultural tightness–looseness and COVID-19 case and mortality rates as of Oct 16, 2020, using ordinary least squares regression. We fit a series of stepwise models to capture whether cultural tightness–looseness explained variation in case and death rates controlling for under-reporting, demographics, geopolitical factors, other cultural dimensions, and climate. Findings The results indicated that, compared with nations with high levels of cultural tightness, nations with high levels of cultural looseness are estimated to have had 4·99 times the number of cases (7132 per million vs 1428 per million, respectively) and 8·71 times the number of deaths (183 per million vs 21 per million, respectively), taking into account a number of controls. A formal evolutionary game theoretic model suggested that tight groups cooperate much faster under threat and have higher survival rates than loose groups. The results suggest that tightening social norms might confer an evolutionary advantage in times of collective threat. Interpretation Nations that are tight and abide by strict norms have had more success than those that are looser as of the October, 2020. New interventions are needed to help countries tighten social norms as they continue to battle COVID-19 and other collective threats. Funding Office of Naval Research, US Navy.

No abstract

Many people practiced COVID-19-related safety measures in the first year of the pandemic, but Republicans were less likely to engage in behaviors such as wearing masks or face coverings than Democrats, suggesting radical disparities in health practices split along political fault lines. We developed an “intervention tournament” which aimed to identify the framings that would promote mask wearing among a representative sample of Republicans and Democrats in the U.S. (N = 4,931). Seven different conditions reflecting different moral values and factors specific to COVID-19—including protection from harm (self), protection from harm (community), patriotic duty, purity, reviving the economy, threat, and scientific evidence—were implemented to identify which framings would “win” in terms of promoting mask wearing compared to a baseline condition. We found that Republicans had significantly more negative attitudes toward masks, lower intentions to wear them, and were less likely to sign or share pledges on social media than Democrats, which was partially mediated by Republicans, compared to Democrats, perceiving that the threat of COVID-19 was lower. None of our framing conditions significantly affected Republicans’ or Democrats’ attitudes, intentions, or behaviors compared to the baseline condition, illustrating the difficulty in overcoming the strength of political polarization during COVID-19.

No abstract

Scientists and policymakers seek to choose effective interventions that promote preventative health measures. We evaluated whether academics, behavioral science practitioners, and laypeople (N = 1034) were able to forecast the effectiveness of seven different messages compared to a baseline message for Republicans and Democrats separately. These messages were designed to nudge mask-wearing attitudes, intentions, and behaviors. When examining predictions across political parties, forecasters predicted larger effects than those observed for Democrats compared to Republicans and made more accurate predictions for Republicans compared to Democrats. These results are partly driven by a lack of nudge effects on Democrats, as reported in Gelfand et al. (J Exp Soc Psychol, 2021). Academics and practitioners made more accurate predictions compared to laypeople. Although forecasters' predictions were correlated with the nudge interventions, all groups overestimated the observed results. We discuss potential reasons for why the forecasts did not perform better and how more accurate forecasts of behavioral intervention outcomes could potentially provide insight that can help save resources and increase the efficacy of interventions.