This study examines the pro-democracy protests of Hong Kong in 2014 and how the protests became sites for Beijing's representations of Chinese national image(s). It argues that 'defensive soft power' can be used to understand the process through which Beijing made such representations and projections. 'Defensive soft power', extending on Nye's soft power is operationally defined as the reactionary activities taken in response to actions that harm or potentially harm a country's national image. Based on an analysis of the data drawn from three mainland news media, several perceptions of China emerge -China as a victim; China as 'reasonable' power; and China as benign and tolerant leader in the China-Hong Kong relation. This research highlights the 'Umbrella Revolution' as an instance where 'defensive soft power' was used to (1) fend off negative national images and (2) project positive national images. Mapping out the process of national image defence will enable readers to better understand a sovereign state's strategies to defend attacks on and promote positive perceptions of its national image.
This article outlines how Xi Jinping has exercised control over diplomatic actors, particularly China's Ministry of Foreign Affairs, and draws out the effects of this control for the ministry and for Chinese foreign policy. Leveraging Bourdieu's (1984) concept of “field,” I demonstrate how Xi has – through processes of socialisation, restriction, and displays of fealty – bred local diplomatic field incentives in which actors exhibit more loyal, assertive, and disciplined behaviour. Next, I introduce the idea of “transversal disruption” – the potential of local fields to disrupt and introduce change on and in overlapping fields, and vice versa. Practice theorists have relatively little to say about inter-field effects, and this article seeks to fill this gap by showing how field rules in the transnational diplomatic space can change when fields meet. I illustrate the above through three cases of field encounters: the multilateral Track II diplomacy field; the transnational fields of the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN); and, the China–Malaysia bilateral diplomatic field.
Sovereignty is the core concept of international relations. Almost without exception, approaches to sovereignty in IR have followed a binary framing where sovereignty is seen to consist of two components: ‘internal’ versus ‘external’ sovereignty, ‘positive’ versus ‘negative’ sovereignty, and so on. These dichotomies stem from the prevailing understanding of sovereignty as the boundary between the inside and the outside of the state. This article builds on and expands these existing approaches by reconceptualizing the sovereign border line as a liminal border space. Relatedly, we theorize the concept of liminality in greater depth by distinguishing between four distinct kinds of liminality: marginal, hybrid, interstitial, and external. Each of these problematizes the dividing line of sovereignty in unique but comparable ways. We empirically illustrate these four kinds of liminality with reference to contested states, ‘tribal’ or ‘indigenous’ groups, NGOs such as Amnesty International, and extremist groups such as ISIS, respectively. Each of these types of liminality entails unique actors, practices, and consequences for the concept of sovereignty. We suggest that liminal sovereignty practices represent the most radical source of change for the concept of sovereignty, yet at the same time, somewhat counterintuitively, they also serve as the best means of clarifying existing, established meanings and practices of sovereignty.
Foreign ministries play a critical role in international relations and are the main interface of diplomacy. Yet, in international relations scholarship, foreign ministries are relatively neglected as an object of scholarly analysis and feature very little around discussions of state's agency and identity. Using China's Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MOFA) as a foil, I suggest that foreign ministries develop dispositions, perceive the social world around them, and react to the world from these orientations. The implication of this, then, are that foreign ministries are contributive to a state's identity and “actorness.” In that way, I develop the concept of institutional habitus to understand China's MOFA and the ways in which this habitus is sustained and performed through MOFA's physical artefacts and its agents. This rendering of habitus responds to sociology's invitation to extend Bourdieu-inspired analysis toward organizations and organizational change and, more broadly, complements existing theorization of state identity by showcasing an important but omitted source of identity: the foreign ministry. I argue that China's MOFA's organizational habitus manifests and preserves itself through three means: first, through the iterative reinscription of institutional memory and invocation of history; second, through displays of fealty; and third, in organizational and personal self-regulation, discipline, and taciturnity.
The ‘Chinese Dream’ (CD) and the ‘Belt Road Initiative’ (BRI) are signature programs of President Xi Jinping. Much of the scholarships on these two projects have concerned itself with either domestic propagandistic effects or external foreign policy impact. These concerns have underpinned the literature’s focus on material expressions of such projects, be it through infrastructural construction in the case of the BRI or propaganda tools in the example of the CD. Yet, an important but understudied element of these two projects is the narratives that they tell and the impact of these narratives. In that regard, this article complements existing studies of the CD and the BRI by reading the projects as grand narratives. Drawing on international practice theory, I trace an explicit link between narratives and practices to demonstrate how narratives activate, anchor, produces and contest political practices of some sub-state actors in China. That is to say narratives: (i) serve as signposts for sub-state actors’ orientations in clarifying what are relevant/irrelevant and appropriate/inappropriate practices; (ii) provide ‘background’ stock of information where actors draw on to legitimize their practices when they speak of the BRI and CD; and (iii) create conditions for both the creation of new practices and contestation of existing ones. I then argue that four narrative-practice processes are seen in the Chinese example: contestation, sustenance, activation, and production.
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