One of the most widespread views in vision research is that top-down control over visual selection is achieved by tuning attention to a particular feature value (e.g., red/yellow). Contrary to this view, previous spatial cueing studies showed that attention can be tuned to relative features of a search target (e.g., redder): An irrelevant distractor (cue) captured attention when it had the same relative color as the target (e.g., redder), and failed to capture when it had a different relative color, regardless of whether the distractor was similar or dissimilar to the target. The present study tested whether the same effects would be observed for eye movements when observers have to search for a color or shape target and when selection errors were very noticeable (resulting in an erroneous eye movement to the distractor). The results corroborated the previous findings, showing that capture by an irrelevant distractor does not depend on the distractor's similarity to the target but on whether it matches or mismatches the relative attributes of the search target. Extending on previous work, we also found that participants can be pretrained to select a color target in virtue of its exact feature value. Contrary to the prevalent feature-based view, the results suggest that visual selection is preferentially biased toward the relative attributes of a search target. Simultaneously, however, visual selection can be biased to specific color values when the task requires it, which rules out a purely relational account of attention and eye movements.

Humans rely on their ability to infer another person's mental state to understand and predict others' behavior ("theory of mind," ToM). Multiple lines of research suggest that not only are humans able to consciously process another person's belief state, but also are able to do so implicitly. Here we explored how general implicit belief states are represented in the brain, compared to those substrates involved in explicit ToM processes. Previous work on this topic has yielded conflicting results, and thus, the extent to which the implicit and explicit ToM systems draw on common neural bases is unclear. Participants were presented with "Sally-Anne" type movies in which a protagonist was falsely led to believe a ball was in one location, only for a puppet to later move it to another location in their absence (false-belief condition). In other movies, the protagonist had their back turned the entire time the puppet moved the ball between the two locations, meaning that they had no opportunity to develop any pre-existing beliefs about the scenario (no-belief condition). Using a group of independently localized explicit ToM brain regions, we found greater activity for false-belief trials, relative to no-belief trials, in the right temporoparietal junction, right superior temporal sulcus, precuneus, and left middle prefrontal gyrus. These findings extend upon previous work on the neural bases of implicit ToM by showing substantial overlap between this system and the explicit ToM system, suggesting that both abilities might recruit a common set of mentalizing processes/functional brain regions. Hum Brain Mapp 38:4760-4772, 2017. © 2017 Wiley Periodicals, Inc.

Despite their common use as model organisms in scientific experiments, pain and suffering in insects remains controversial and poorly understood. Here we explore potential pain experience in honeybees (Apis mellifera) by testing the self-administration of an analgesic drug. Foragers were subjected to two different types of injuries: (i) a clip that applied continuous pressure to one leg and (ii) amputation of one tarsus. The bees were given a choice between two feeders, one offering pure sucrose solution, the other sucrose solution plus morphine. We found that sustained pinching had no effect on the amount of morphine consumed, and hence is unlikely to be experienced as painful. The amputated bees did not shift their relative preference towards the analgesic either, but consumed more morphine and more solution in total compared to intact controls. While our data do not provide evidence for the self-administration of morphine in response to pain, they suggest that injured bees increase their overall food intake, presumably to meet the increased energy requirements for an immune response caused by wounding. We conclude that further experiments are required to gain insights into potential pain-like states in honeybees and other insects.

In visual search, some fixations are made between stimuli on empty regions, commonly referred to as “centre-of-gravity” fixations (henceforth: COG fixations). Previous studies have shown that observers with task expertise show more COG fixations than novices. This led to the view that COG fixations reflect simultaneous encoding of multiple stimuli, allowing more efficient processing of task-related items. The present study tested whether COG fixations also aid performance in visual search tasks with unfamiliar and abstract stimuli. Moreover, to provide evidence for the multiple-item processing view, we analysed the effects of COG fixations on the number and dwell times of stimulus fixations. The results showed that (1) search efficiency increased with increasing COG fixations even in search for unfamiliar stimuli and in the absence of special higher-order skills, (2) COG fixations reliably reduced the number of stimulus fixations and their dwell times, indicating processing of multiple distractors, and (3) the proportion of COG fixations was dynamically adapted to potential information gain of COG locations. A second experiment showed that COG fixations are diminished when stimulus positions unpredictably vary across trials. Together, the results support the multiple-item processing view, which has important implications for current theories of visual search.

The surprise capture hypothesis states that a stimulus will capture attention to the extent that it is preattentively available and deviates from task-expectancies. Interestingly, it has been noted by Horstmann (Psychological Science 13: 499-505. doi: 10.1111/1467-9280.00488, 2002, Human Perception and Performance 31: 1039-1060. doi: 10.1037/00961523.31.5.1039, 2005, Psychological Research, 70, 13-25, 2006) that the time course of capture by such classes of stimuli appears distinct from that of capture by expected stimuli. Specifically, attention shifts to an unexpected stimulus are delayed relative to an expected stimulus (delayed onset account). Across two experiments, we investigated this claim under conditions of unguided (Exp. 1) and guided (Exp. 2) search using eye-movements as the primary index of attentional selection. In both experiments, we found strong evidence of surprise capture for the first presentation of an unannounced color singleton. However, in both experiments the pattern of eye-movements was not consistent with a delayed onset account of attention capture. Rather, we observed costs associated with the unexpected stimulus only once the target had been selected. We propose an interference account of surprise capture to explain our data and argue that this account also can explain existing patterns of data in the literature.