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Retail gasoline markets have been found to exhibit either price volatility and price dispersion or price rigidity and uniformity across large metropolitan areas. The purpose of this paper is to identify a theoretical explanation for these patterns of pricing behavior, and to look for evidence consistent with the theory by examining market structure, conduct, and spatial pricing patterns in different retail gasoline markets in Canada. The study utilizes a novel source of price data: price observations reported to internet data collection sites. The firm and station specific price data are consistent with the presence of tacitly collusive behavior in one retail gasoline market and the presence of maverick retailers that prevent tacit collusion in the other retail market. Copyright Springer-Verlag 2004classifications:  L11, L41, L81,

"Using gasoline station price data collected eight times per day for 103 d for 27 stations in Guelph, Ontario, it is found that, consistent with an informal theory of competitive gasoline pricing, stations set prices to match a small number of other stations. However, these matched stations are not necessarily the closest. While retailers frequently respond to price changes within 2 h, many take considerably longer. Finally, while price decreases do ripple across the market like falling dominos, increases propagate across the city based more on geographic location and source of price control than on proximity to leaders of these increases. "("JEL "L13, L40, L81) Copyright (c) 2008 Western Economic Association International.