We investigate the (sell-side) analyst rankings ofInstitutional Investor(I/I) andThe Wall Street Journal(WSJ), using data from 1993–2005. We find that factors with a primary component of recognition are the most important determinants of the rankings, although performance measures are statistically significant determinants in some cases. The single exception to this finding is with existing WSJ stars, where industry-adjusted investment-recommendation performance is theonlysignificant determinant of repeating as a star. Further, in the year after becoming stars, the recommendations of WSJ stars are significantly worse than those of nonstars; and the recommendations and earnings forecasts of I/I stars, as well as the earnings forecasts of WSJ stars, are not significantly different from those of nonstars. We conclude that these rankings are largely “popularity contests.”

We compare reactions in the prices and trading patterns of common stocks and closed-end funds (CEFs), securities with substantially different investor clienteles, to the Sept. 11, 2001 terrorist attacks. When the market reopened 6 days later, retail investors sold and there were sharp price declines, even in assets with net institutional buying. In the subsequent 2 weeks, price reversals were substantially security specific and thus not simply due to improved systematic sentiment. Consistent with microstructure theory, comparisons between CEFs and common stocks show the speed of these reversals depended significantly on the relative quality and availability of information about fundamental values.

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The lessons of the leasing literature concerning the impact of leases on the debt capacity of a firm are reviewed and summarized to establish an approach to the analysis of the corporate bond refunding decision. A general proposition regarding financial obligation parity is established, and from that a clear bond refunding decision rule is developed. Previous debates in the literature about appropriate discount rates and about the appropriate cash flows to be discounted for refunding decisions are clarified.

We use the horrific events of September 11, 2001 ("nine-eleven") as a natural test of the hypothesis that closed-end mutual fund discounts from fund net asset values reflect small investor sentiment. Because nine-eleven was a sudden, unforeseen, and significantly negative and exogenous shock to the world, the capital markets, and investor sentiment, our test avoids many of the problems of extant studies. Discounts worsened dramatically following the event, and then recovered alongside the broader market. This finding is consistent with the hypothesis that discounts reflect the sentiment of small investors, who took their cues from the broader market's overall movement.We thank Steve Ferris, the editor, and two anonymous reviewers for helpful comments. We also thank Hua (Allen) Song for helpful research assistance, and Larry Fauver and Andrea Heuson for helpful comments. 515 516 T. R. Burch et al./The Financial Review 38 (2003) [515][516][517][518][519][520][521][522][523][524][525][526][527][528][529]