Recent developments in the field of artificial intelligence and data analytics are facilitating the automation of some consumer chores (e.g., in smart homes and in self-driving cars) and allow the emergence of big-data-driven, micro-targeting marketing practices (e.g., personalized content recommendation algorithms). We contend that those developments can generate a tension for marketers, consumers, and policy makers: They can, on the one hand, contribute to consumer well-being by making consumer choices easier, more practical, and more efficient. On the other hand, they can also undermine consumers' sense of autonomy, the absence of which can be detrimental to consumer well-being. Drawing on diverse perspectives from marketing, economics, philosophy, neuroscience, and psychology, we explore how consumers' sense of autonomy in making choices affects their wellbeing. We discuss how new technologies may enhance or diminish consumers' perceptions of being in control of their choices and how either of those can, in turn, enhance of detract from consumer well-being. Building on this, we identify open research questions in the domain of choice, well-being, and consumer welfare, and suggest avenues for future research.

This paper explores conflicting implications of firm-specific human capital (FSHC) for firm performance. Existing theory predicts a productivity effect that can be enhanced with strong incentives. We propose an offsetting agency effect: FSHC may facilitate more-sophisticated 'gaming' of incentives, to the detriment of firm performance. Using a unique dataset from a multiunit retail bank, we document both effects and estimate their net impact. Managers with superior FSHC are more productive in selling loans but are also more likely to manipulate loan terms to increase incentive payouts. We find that resulting profits are two percentage points lower for high-FSHC managers. Finally, profit losses increase more rapidly for high-FSHC managers, indicating adverse learning. Our results suggest that FSHC can create agency costs that outweigh its productive benefits. 1 We note that we develop a novel and replicable empirical methodology to investigate these contingency factors. Our method also provides one possible path for estimating rent appropriation in firms, which Coff (1999) has highlighted as a major challenge in organizational research.

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T wo types of contractual solutions have been proposed for resolving incentive conflicts in vertical relationships: formal and relational (i.e., enforceable or not by third parties). Much is known about the optimal structure of formal contracts, but relatively little is known about the structure of relational contracts. We study a core feature of the latter: the conditions leading to continuation of the relationship, whose prospect gives relational contracts their force. We build a formal model of a vertical relationship between two parties that endogenizes the choice of the minimum performance necessary for continuation as a function of the values of contractibles, noncontractibles, and outside options. The model highlights a basic trade-off between providing strong incentives for the present (incentive effect) and safeguarding relationships for the future (termination effect). The stable relationships that follow from a more forgiving contract are more important under certain conditions (when a lot of value is jointly created by exchange partners, i.e., high contractible value, high noncontractible value, or unattractive outside options); however, strong incentives from a less forgiving contract are more important under other conditions (when a formal contract is insufficient and a relational contract is most important, i.e., high noncontractible relative to contractible value). We discuss implications for the choice of governance of interorganizational relationships.