Purpose: We investigated the different impacts warranted and unwarranted discounts have on IPOs valuation performance and underpricing. Research methodology: We used multivariate ordinary least squares regression analysis to examine discounts’ determinants, and their impacts on valuation errors and underpricing. We also used bias and accuracy errors to examine valuation performance. Results: We find both final offer price accuracy errors and underpricing negatively related to warranted discounts and positively related to unwarranted discounts. Additionally, warranted discounts are positively related to fair value estimate bias errors, contrarily to unwarranted discounts. Limitations: The relatively small sample size represents our study’s main limitation. Contribution: Unwarranted discounts allow assessing by issuers' underpricing level and underwriters’ sub-optimal efforts and investors' positive returns. Whereas warranted discounts allow issuers to avoid overpricing IPOs and communicate their intrinsic value, investors assess their negative returns, and underwriters reveal their superior qualitative valuation. Regulators can increase after-market efficiency and protect investors by implementing unwarranted discounts’ constraints and warranted discounts’ thresholds.

In the present study, we investigate the impact of discounts on the valuation performance of initial public offerings. Review of existing literature reveals that such valuation performance lacks examination in terms of discounts as most studies focus on valuation methods. Accordingly, we examine the valuation performance of initial public offerings before and after applying discounts. Whereby, underwriters apply a deliberate discount to fair value estimate before setting the final offer price. We assess the valuation performance of initial public offerings through bias and accuracy errors as well as explainability. When valuation errors are low, the valuation performance is deemed superior. Our sample consists of 39 initial public offerings conducted on the Moroccan stock exchange between 2004 and 2018. We use publicly available prospectus to collect necessary data. Our results reveal that discounts applied to fair value estimate when setting the final offer price reduce valuation errors. Consequently, discounts enhance the valuation performance of initial public offerings. In fact, both optimistic and pessimistic final offer price are closer to market price in comparison with optimistic and pessimistic fair value estimate. We conclude that if valuations conducted by underwriters are objective, discounts serve as a qualitative valuation to supplement the quantitative one. This qualitative valuation incorporates relevant information about market circumstances with regard to initial public offerings. This indicates the superior fundamental analysis underwriters are capable of performing. However, if valuations conducted by underwriters are subjective, then underwriters deliberately overestimates fair value estimate to justify applying discounts when setting the final offer price. Nonetheless, our study reveals that discounts are more than proportional to valuation optimism. Consequently, while discounts absorb this valuation optimism, they also set a valuation pessimism. In other words, discounts avoid overpricing initial public offerings, yet they result in underpricing them. Interestingly, we discover that although optimistic fair value estimate and pessimistic final offer price have approximate valuation errors, underwriters are more comfortable underpricing initial public offerings than overpricing them.

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