This study examines how the legal and regulatory changes in China affect the relationship between client economic importance and audit quality. At the individual auditor level, we find that the propensity to issue modified audit opinions (MAOs) is negatively correlated with client importance from 1995 to 2000. However, from 2001 to 2004, when the institutional environment became more investor-friendly, the propensity to issue MAOs is positively associated with client importance. These findings are corroborated by an analysis of regulatory sanctions. Although client importance measured at the office level is also negatively related to the propensity for MAOs from 1995 to 2000 without controlling for the auditor-level client importance, this result is sensitive to model specification and sample composition. Our results suggest that (1) institutional improvements prompt auditors to prioritize the costs of compromising quality over the economic benefits gained from important clients; and (2) the impact of client importance on audit decisions appears to be different at the individual auditor and office levels.
We examine whether and how individual auditors affect audit outcomes using a large set of archival Chinese data. We analyze approximately 800 individual auditors and find that they exhibit significant variation in audit quality. The effects that individual auditors have on audit quality are both economically and statistically significant, and are pronounced in both large and small audit firms. We also find that the individual auditor effects on audit quality can be partially explained by auditor characteristics, such as educational background, Big N audit firm experience, rank in the audit firm, and political affiliation. Our findings highlight the importance of scrutinizing and understanding audit quality at the individual auditor level.
Data Availability: Data used in this study are publicly available from the sources described herein.
Contemporaneous studies generally find a negative relationship between audit partner busyness (APB), measured as the number of clients in an audit partner's portfolio, and audit quality. Their argument is that a busy partner does not devote sufficient time to properly audit his average client. Contrary to these studies, we argue that when busyness is optimally chosen by the partner, in equilibrium, there is no causal relationship between APB and audit quality. Using Australian data for the 1999-2010 period, we show that APB is not reliably linked to audit quality, consistent with this equilibrium theory. We argue that causality can be ascribed to the APB-audit quality relationship when accounting scandals exogenously shocked the Australian audit market during the 2002-04 period and APB likely deviated from optimum levels. Supporting this disequilibrium view, we find that higher APB reduces a partner's propensity to issue first-time going-concern opinions during this period. Our evidence highlights the importance of the equilibrium condition in testing empirical associations between audit outcomes and endogenous auditor attributes, and shows that the detrimental effect of APB on audit quality is not as pervasive as contemporaneous studies suggest. * Accepted by Michel Magnan. We gratefully acknowledge the helpful comments and suggestions made by
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