In a secure bit commitment protocol involving only classical physics, A commits either a 0 or a 1 to B. If quantum information is used in the protocol, A may be able to commit a state of the form α|0 + β|1. If so, she can also commit mixed states in which the committed bit is entangled with other quantum states under her control. We introduce here a quantum cryptographic primitive, bit commitment with a certificate of classicality (BCCC), which differs from standard bit commitment in that it guarantees that the committed state has a fixed classical value. We show that no unconditionally secure BCCC protocol based on special relativity and quantum theory exists. We also propose complete definitions of security for quantum and relativistic bit commitment.

Basic techniques to prove the unconditional security of quantum cryptography are described. They are applied to a quantum key distribution protocol proposed by Bennett and Brassard [1984]. The proof considers a practical variation on the protocol in which the channel is noisy and photons may be lost during the transmission. Each individual signal sent into the channel must contain a single photon or any two-dimensional system in the exact state described in the protocol. No restriction is imposed on the detector used at the receiving side of the channel, except that whether or not the received system is detected must be independent of the basis used to measure this system.

Quantum key distribution, first proposed by Bennett and Brassard, provides a possible key distribution scheme whose security depends only on the quantum laws of physics. So far the protocol has been proved secure even under channel noise and detector faults of the receiver, but is vulnerable if the photon source used is imperfect. In this paper we propose and give a concrete design for a new concept, self-checking source, which requires the manufacturer of the photon source to provide certain tests; these tests are designed such that, if passed, the source is guaranteed to be adequate for the security of the quantum key distribution protocol, even though the testing devices may not be built to the original specification. The main mathematical result is a structural theorem which states that, for any state in a Hilbert space, if certain EPR-type equations are satisfied, the state must be essentially the orthogonal sum of EPR pairs.

We study, in the context of quantum information and quantum communication, a configuration of devices that includes (1) a source of some unknown bipartite quantum state that is claimed to be the Bell state $\Phi^+$ and (2) two spatially separated but otherwise unknown measurement apparatus, one on each side, that are each claimed to execute an orthogonal measurement at an angle $\theta \in \{-\pi/8, 0, \pi/8\}$ that is chosen by the user. We show that, if the nine distinct probability distributions that are generated by the self checking configuration, one for each pair of angles, are consistent with the specifications, the source and the two measurement apparatus are guaranteed to be identical to the claimed specifications up to a local change of basis on each side. We discuss the connection with quantum cryptography. testing quantum apparatus (pp273-286) D. Mayers and A. Yao We study, in the context of quantum information and quantum communication, a configuration of devices that includes (1) a source of some unknown bipartite quantum state that is claimed to be the Bell state $\Phi^+$ and (2) two spatially separated but otherwise unknown measurement apparatus, one on each side, that are each claimed to execute an orthogonal measurement at an angle $\theta \in \{-\pi/8, 0, \pi/8\}$ that is chosen by the user. We show that, if the nine distinct probability distributions that are generated by the self checking configuration, one for each pair of angles, are consistent with the specifications, the source and the two measurement apparatus are guaranteed to be identical to the claimed specifications up to a local change of basis on each side. We discuss the connection with quantum cryptography.

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