Abstract:We use a dynamic game model of a two-country monetary union to study the impacts of an exogenous fall in aggregate demand, the resulting increase in public debt, and the consequences of a sovereign debt haircut for a member country or bloc of the union. In this union, the governments of participating countries pursue national goals when deciding on fiscal policies, whereas the common central bank's monetary policy aims at union-wide objective variables. The union considered is asymmetric, consisting of a "core" with lower initial public debt, and a "periphery" with higher initial public debt. The ''periphery'' may experience a haircut due to high level of its sovereign debt. We calculate numerical solutions of the dynamic game between the governments and the central bank using the OPTGAME algorithm. We show that a haircut as modeled in our study is disadvantageous for both the "core" and the "periphery" of the monetary union. Moreover, the cooperative solution is preferable to the noncooperative equilibrium solution (both without and with a haircut), providing an argument for coordinated fiscal policies in a monetary union.
Standard-Nutzungsbedingungen:Die Dokumente auf EconStor dürfen zu eigenen wissenschaftlichen Zwecken und zum Privatgebrauch gespeichert und kopiert werden.Sie dürfen die Dokumente nicht für öffentliche oder kommerzielle Zwecke vervielfältigen, öffentlich ausstellen, öffentlich zugänglich machen, vertreiben oder anderweitig nutzen.Sofern die Verfasser die Dokumente unter Open-Content-Lizenzen (insbesondere CC-Lizenzen) zur Verfügung gestellt haben sollten, gelten abweichend von diesen Nutzungsbedingungen die in der dort genannten Lizenz gewährten Nutzungsrechte. Terms of use: Documents in Abstract:We use a dynamic game model of a two-country monetary union to study the impacts of an exogenous fall in aggregate demand, the resulting increase in public debt, and the consequences of a sovereign debt "haircut" for a member country or bloc of the union. In this union, the governments of participating countries pursue national goals when deciding on fiscal policies, while the common central bank's monetary policy aims at union-wide objective variables. The union considered is asymmetric, consisting of a "core" with lower initial public debt, and a "periphery" with higher initial public debt. The "periphery'' may experience a debt relief ("haircut") due to an evolving high sovereign debt. Calibrating the model to the Euro Area, we calculate numerical solutions of the dynamic game between the governments and the central bank using the OPTGAME algorithm. We show that a "haircut" as modeled in our study is disadvantageous for both the "core" and the "periphery" of the monetary union. Moreover, the cooperative solution is preferable to the noncooperative equilibrium solution (both without and with a "haircut"), providing an argument for coordinated fiscal policies in a monetary union.
Standard-Nutzungsbedingungen:Die Dokumente auf EconStor dürfen zu eigenen wissenschaftlichen Zwecken und zum Privatgebrauch gespeichert und kopiert werden.Sie dürfen die Dokumente nicht für öffentliche oder kommerzielle Zwecke vervielfältigen, öffentlich ausstellen, öffentlich zugänglich machen, vertreiben oder anderweitig nutzen.Sofern die Verfasser die Dokumente unter Open-Content-Lizenzen (insbesondere CC-Lizenzen) zur Verfügung gestellt haben sollten, gelten abweichend von diesen Nutzungsbedingungen die in der dort genannten Lizenz gewährten Nutzungsrechte. Terms of use: Documents in
Standard-Nutzungsbedingungen:Die Dokumente auf EconStor dürfen zu eigenen wissenschaftlichen Zwecken und zum Privatgebrauch gespeichert und kopiert werden.Sie dürfen die Dokumente nicht für öffentliche oder kommerzielle Zwecke vervielfältigen, öffentlich ausstellen, öffentlich zugänglich machen, vertreiben oder anderweitig nutzen.Sofern die Verfasser die Dokumente unter Open-Content-Lizenzen (insbesondere CC-Lizenzen) zur Verfügung gestellt haben sollten, gelten abweichend von diesen Nutzungsbedingungen die in der dort genannten Lizenz gewährten Nutzungsrechte. Terms of use: Documents in AbstractOptimal control of dynamic econometric models has a wide variety of applications including economic policy relevant issues. There are several algorithms extending the basic case of a linear-quadratic optimization and taking nonlinearity and stochastics into account, but being still limited in a variety of ways, e.g., symmetry of the objective function and identical data frequencies of control variables. To overcome these problems, an alternative approach based on heuristics is suggested. To this end, we apply a 'classical' algorithm (OPTCON) and a heuristic approach (Differential Evolution) to three different econometric models and compare their performance. In this paper we consider scenarios of symmetric and asymmetric quadratic objective functions. Results provide a strong support for the heuristic approach encouraging its further application to optimum control problems.
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