Purpose This paper aims to answer how corporate governance and corporate social responsibility (“CSR”) affect the relationship between value creation and tax avoidance. This study further analyses the impact of the institutional environment, i.e. whether a country is rather a liberal or a coordinated market economy, on the relationship between CSR and tax avoidance. Design/methodology/approach The empirical analysis comprises a panel data set of 7,924 observations for the years from 2005 to 2014 for European companies. The relationship between value creation and tax avoidance is tested by grouping the sample in high and low CSR performers. Similarly, the impact of the type of market economy is analysed for the firms. Findings The research design does not find evidence that tax avoidance is creating value. The empirical findings reveal that there is a positive relationship between value creation and the effective tax rate for firms with low social and environmental characteristics. Further, this analysis could show that stronger corporate governance is associated with a lower effective tax rate in both coordinated and liberal market economies. The analysis identifies social strengths being associated with a higher effective tax rate for coordinated market economies. Practical implications It is proposed to encourage CSR disclosure. The creation of incentives for social strengths could increase tax revenue. Firms should reconsider whether the engagement in tax avoidance is worth it and pursue social responsibility to achieve higher value creation for their stakeholders. Originality/value The paper challenges the intuitive expectation that tax avoidance creates value. It is suggested that the governance and CSR culture, as well as the tax legislation in Europe, is different to the USA. Conclusively, tax avoidance is not generating value for the European sample.
In a controlled laboratory experiment, subjects had to fold letters in order to earn money. While the net income per letter was the same in the three treatments, the gross income varied and the tax rate was 0, 25, and 50 percent. Although work incentives should be the same in all treatments, subjects worked harder and longer when they were taxed. We conclude that this is because of a net wage illusion effect. The existence of this effect demonstrates that not only are the tax rate and the tax base of importance for work incentives, but the perception of a tax is also important.
We use a laboratory experiment to study the extent to which investors' choices are affected by limited loss deduction in income taxation. We first compare investment behavior in the no tax baseline to a tax control setting, in which the income from investments is taxed. We find that investors significantly reduce their risk-taking as predicted by theory. Next we compare the baseline investment choices to choices under three different types of income taxation. We observe that risk-taking is significantly increased with partial and with capped loss deduction, but is unaffected by a tax system that allows no loss deduction. Since in all these treatments the after tax outcomes of the prospects were identical, we conjecture that investors have a positively biased perception of partial and capped loss deduction that promotes their willingness to take risks.
a b s t r a c tWe use a laboratory experiment to study the extent to which investors' choices are affected by limited loss deduction in income taxation. We first compare investment behavior in the no tax baseline to a tax control setting, in which the income from investments is taxed. We find that investors significantly reduce their risk-taking as predicted by theory. Next we compare the baseline investment choices to choices under three different types of income taxation. We observe that risk-taking is significantly increased with partial and with capped loss deduction, but is unaffected by a tax system that allows no loss deduction. Since in all these treatments the after tax outcomes of the prospects were identical, we conjecture that investors have a positively biased perception of partial and capped loss deduction that promotes their willingness to take risks.
Standard-Nutzungsbedingungen:Die Dokumente auf EconStor dürfen zu eigenen wissenschaftlichen Zwecken und zum Privatgebrauch gespeichert und kopiert werden.Sie dürfen die Dokumente nicht für öffentliche oder kommerzielle Zwecke vervielfältigen, öffentlich ausstellen, öffentlich zugänglich machen, vertreiben oder anderweitig nutzen.Sofern die Verfasser die Dokumente unter Open-Content-Lizenzen (insbesondere CC-Lizenzen) zur Verfügung gestellt haben sollten, gelten abweichend von diesen Nutzungsbedingungen die in der dort genannten Lizenz gewährten Nutzungsrechte. Terms of use: Documents in AbstractIn a variety of recent papers, it is shown that individuals do not take taxes correctly into account, which results in distorted or unexpected investment behavior. We shed further light on the discussion of such behavioral tax perception biases by analyzing intrinsic and extrinsic effects on decision behavior. We study two dimensions: (1) the influence of emotions and cognition (individual dimension, intrinsic effects) and (2) the influence of available tax information by varying tax complexity and salience (tax system dimension, extrinsic effects). In our laboratory experiment, we construct the payoff structure such that the subjects are confronted with exactly the same choices in net terms in a situation with or without a capital gains tax. This design allows us to identify pure tax perception biases. We show that both dimensions are able to explain tax perception biases. In particular, we find evidence that perceived risk (cognition) is lower and consequently willingness to take risk is higher with a capital gains tax (with full loss offset provision) than without taxation. Furthermore, this positive effect on risky investment is higher in a situation with a rather low level of tax information in which tax complexity is high and tax salience is low. In addition, we are able to provide evidence that the use of decision heuristics can explain the observed tax bias differences between our information treatments. In particular, we find a negative relationship between the information level and the use of heuristics.
We apply conjoint analysis to study the influence of tax labeling and tax earmarking on German taxpayers' willingness to contribute. From a survey based sample we show that labeling and earmarking effects can substantially increase participants' willingness to contribute, which results in a considerable deviation from a pure consumption maximizing behavior. Furthermore, we give an explanation for this effect regarding socio-demographic attributes of German taxpayers. These results explain the variety in tax labels and provide implications for tax policy regarding further reforms of the tax and contribution system: "Labeling" and "earmarking" of contributions are important instruments in "selling" policies and increasing tax revenue.
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