Collective events can generate intense emotions, shape group identities, and forge strong bonds. Do these effects extend to remote participation, and what are the psychological mechanisms underpinning their social power? We monitored psycho-physiological activity among groups of basketball fans who either attended games in-person (in a stadium) or watched games live on television in small groups. In-person attendance was associated with greater synchronicity in autonomic nervous system activation at the group level, which resulted in more transformative experiences and contributed to stronger identity fusion. Our findings suggest that the social effects of sports depend substantially on the inter-personal dynamics unfolding among fans, rather than being prompted simply by watching the game itself. Given the increasing prevalence of virtual experiences, this has potentially wide-reaching implications for many domains of collective human interaction.

Religious belief is a topic of longstanding interest to psychological science, but the psychology of religious disbelief is a relative newcomer. One prominently discussed model is analytic atheism, wherein cognitive reflection, as measured with the Cognitive Reflection Test, overrides religious intuitions and instruction. Consistent with this model, performance-based measures of cognitive reflection predict religious disbelief in WEIRD (Western, Educated, Industrialized, Rich, & Democratic) samples. However, the generality of analytic atheism remains unknown. Drawing on a large global sample (N = 3461) from 13 religiously, demographically, and culturally diverse societies, we find that analytic atheism as usually assessed is in fact quite fickle cross-culturally, appearing robustly only in aggregate analyses and in three individual countries. The results provide additional evidence for culture’s effects on core beliefs.

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Reliance on convenience samples for psychological experiments has led to the oversampling of Western, Educated, Industrialized, Rich, and Democratic (WEIRD) populations (Henrich et al. 2010a). Our analysis of academic articles from six leading psychology journals revealed a significantly lower but still very high percentage of studies from European and English-speaking nations (92%), compared to a decade ago (95%), largely due to more studies from Asia (6%). Further analysis of four cognitive science of religion (CSR) journals showed how a more representative field is possible (67% from the Western and Other region), with proportionately more studies in Latin America (4%) and Africa (7%) than psychology (<1% each). Thanks to its interdisciplinary nature, CSR is in a good position to address “WEIRD” problems and may be able to offer psychology methodological and epistemological tools that involve diversifying sample populations, increasing ecological validity, capturing the causes and consequences of cultural variation, and developing novel methodologies. Despite the challenges, we encourage more researchers to embrace the lessons offered by CSR’s history of global and interdisciplinary research. Where WEIRD identifies the populations we need to stop privileging, conducting work that is not just Worldwide, but also In Situ, Local, and Diverse (WILD) is what researchers themselves can aspire to. Just as nineteenth century “armchair anthropologists” were replaced by generations of ethnographers who went out into the real world to study human variation, so modern day psychologists need to conduct experiments outside the lab with suitably heterogeneous populations.

The Cognitive Science of Religion (CSR) is an academic subdiscipline that studies the mental capacities and processes that underlie recurrent patterns of religious thought and behavior. The main focus of CSR is on unconscious processes such as thoughts, biases, emotions, and motivations. Unlike the related field of the Psychology of Religion, whose primary level of analysis is the individual, CSR is primarily interested in accounting for cultural forms and explaining why these particular forms are more widespread than others. Like Cognitive Science in general, CSR is interdisciplinary, employing theoretical perspectives and methodological tools from such diverse fields as religious studies; cultural, cognitive, and evolutionary anthropology; cognitive, developmental, and evolutionary psychology; philosophy; neuroscience; biology; behavioral ecology; history; and archaeology.Given the interdisciplinary and pluralistic character of the field, there are ongoing debates over methodological priorities and theoretical positions. However, CSR scholars by and large agree on a set of basic overarching assumptions. First of all, religion is not a sui generis domain of the human existence and therefore can and should be subject to explanatory scrutiny just like any other cultural expression. Second, a scientific study of religion must necessarily adopt a position of methodological naturalism; religious explanations of religious phenomena cannot be taken to have any explanatory value in themselves. In line with evolutionary psychology, it is accepted that cultural forms are subject to the biological constraints of the human brain and the universal mental capacities of the human species, as they have evolved through natural selection. In line with Cognitive Science, it is also accepted that the mind is not a blank slate nor a general-purpose computational machine but comes pre-equipped with a host of specialized mechanisms, each with a specific function. Based on these premises, cognitive scientists of religion are interested in exploring the causal mechanisms that might account for the recurrent patterns of religious beliefs and practices found around the world. The Development of CSRAlthough the mental underpinnings of religion had often been the focus of earlier research in the psychology, sociology, and anthropology of religion, a more concerted cognitive study of cultural forms was inspired by the cognitive revolution of the 1950s and especially by the work of Noam Chomsky (1957) on language. Chomsky