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A recent meta-analysis (S. Vazire & D. C. Funder, 2006) suggested that narcissism and impulsivity are related and that impulsivity partially accounts for the relation between narcissism and self-defeating behaviors (SDB). This research examines these hypotheses in two studies and tests a competing hypothesis that Extraversion and Agreeableness account for this relation. In Study 1, we examined the relations among narcissism, impulsivity, and aggression. Both narcissism and impulsivity predicted aggression, but impulsivity did not mediate the narcissism-aggression relation. In Study 2, narcissism was related to a measure of SDB and manifested divergent relations with a range of impulsivity traits from three measures. None of the impulsivity models accounted for the narcissism-SDB relation, although there were unique mediating paths for traits related to sensation and fun seeking. The domains of Extraversion and low Agreeableness successfully mediated the entire narcissism-SDB relation. We address the discrepancy between the current and meta-analytic findings.

Executive functions (EFs) are important for goal-directed behavior and have been linked with a number of important constructs like intelligence. The current study examined the link between EFs and aspects of normal and abnormal personality. Latent variables of working memory, fluency, response inhibition, and vigilance EFs were examined along with fluid intelligence (gF). It was found that the EFs were separate yet correlated, and that each was related to gF. Furthermore, it was found that aspects of personality as measured by the Five-Factor Model and the BIS/BAS were differentially related to the EFs and gF. Examination of personality disorder measures also demonstrated differential relationships with the EFs and gF. The results suggest a number of systematic and important links between EFs and personality and suggest the need for a more unified field of individual differences.

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The literature on recursive theory of mind (TOM) reasoning in interactive decision making (reasoning of the type ''I think that you think that I think. . .'') has been pessimistic, suggesting that adults attribute to others levels of reasoning that are low and slow to increase with learning. In four experiments with college-age adults playing sequential games, we examined whether choices and predictions were consistent with believing that others pursue their immediate self-interest, or with believing that others reason through their own decision making, with fixed-sum games that were simpler and more competitive. This manipulation led to higher-level default TOM reasoning; indeed, reasoning against a lower-level opponent was frequently consistent with assuming the opponent's reasoning to be higher-level, leading to suboptimal choices. We conclude that TOM reasoning is not of a low level in all game settings; rather, individuals may display effective TOM reasoning, reflecting realistic assumptions about their opponents, in competitive and relatively simple games.