Members of the Breast Cancer Prevention Collaborative Work Group provided constructive comments on the development of this hypothesis at meetings of the International Society for Environmental Epidemiology held at the National

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This article develops and assesses novel indicators of respiratory and other morbidity and mortality following London's lethal smog in the winter of 1952. Public health insurance claims, hospital admission rates for cardiac and respiratory disease, pneumonia cases, mortality records, influenza reports, temperature, and air pollutant concentrations are analyzed for December-February 1952-1953 and compared with those for the previous year or years. Mortality rates for the smog episode from December 1952 to February 1953 were 50-300% higher than the previous year. Claims that the smog only elevated health risks during and immediately following the peak fog 5-9 December 1952 and that an influenza epidemic accounted fully for persisting mortality increases in the first 2 months of 1953 are rejected. We estimate about 12,000 excess deaths occurred from December 1952 through February 1953 because of acute and persisting effects of the 1952 London smog. Pollution levels during the London smog were 5-19 times above current regulatory standards and guidelines and approximate current levels in some rapidly developing regions. Ambient pollution in many regions poses serious risks to public health.

Hormesis (defined operationally as low-dose stimulation, high-dose inhibition) is often used to promote the notion that while high-level exposures to toxic chemicals could be detrimental to human health, low-level exposures would be beneficial. Some proponents claim hormesis is an adaptive, generalizable phenomenon and argue that the default assumption for risk assessments should be that toxic chemicals induce stimulatory (i.e., “beneficial”) effects at low exposures. In many cases, nonmonotonic dose–response curves are called hormetic responses even in the absence of any mechanistic characterization of that response. Use of the term “hormesis,” with its associated descriptors, distracts from the broader and more important questions regarding the frequency and interpretation of nonmonotonic dose responses in biological systems. A better understanding of the biological basis and consequences of nonmonotonic dose–response curves is warranted for evaluating human health risks. The assumption that hormesis is generally adaptive is an oversimplification of complex biological processes. Even if certain low-dose effects were sometimes considered beneficial, this should not influence regulatory decisions to allow increased environmental exposures to toxic and carcinogenic agents, given factors such as interindividual differences in susceptibility and multiplicity in exposures. In this commentary we evaluate the hormesis hypothesis and potential adverse consequences of incorporating low-dose beneficial effects into public health decisions.

Background: Greenhouse gas (GHG) mitigation policies can provide ancillary benefits in terms of short-term improvements in air quality and associated health benefits. Several studies have analyzed the ancillary impacts of GHG policies for a variety of locations, pollutants, and policies. In this paper we review the existing evidence on ancillary health benefits relating to air pollution from various GHG strategies and provide a framework for such analysis.

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This article develops and assesses novel indicators of respiratory and other morbidity and mortality following London's lethal smog in the winter of 1952. Public health insurance claims, hospital admission rates for cardiac and respiratory disease, pneumonia cases, mortality records, influenza reports, temperature, and air pollutant concentrations are analyzed for December-February 1952-1953 and compared with those for the previous year or years. Mortality rates for the smog episode from December 1952 to February 1953 were 50-300% higher than the previous year. Claims that the smog only elevated health risks during and immediately following the peak fog 5-9 December 1952 and that an influenza epidemic accounted fully for persisting mortality increases in the first 2 months of 1953 are rejected. We estimate about 12,000 excess deaths occurred from December 1952 through February 1953 because of acute and persisting effects of the 1952 London smog. Pollution levels during the London smog were 5-19 times above current regulatory standards and guidelines and approximate current levels in some rapidly developing regions. Ambient pollution in many regions poses serious risks to public health.

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