The post-Maastricht period is marked by an integration paradox. While the basic constitutional features of the European Union have remained stable, EU activity has expanded to an unprecedented degree. This form of integration without supranationalism is no exception or temporary deviation from traditional forms of European integration. Rather, it is a distinct phase of European integration, what is called 'the new intergovernmentalism' in this article. This approach to postMaastricht integration challenges theories that associate integration with transfers of competences from national capitals to supranational institutions and those that reduce integration to traditional socioeconomic or security-driven interests. This article explains the integration paradox in terms of transformations in Europe's political economy, changes in preference formation and the decline of the 'permissive consensus'. It presents a set of six hypotheses that develop further the main claims of the new intergovernmentalism and that can be used as a basis for future research.

Taking economic co-ordination in EMU as a starting point, this article explores the development of the open method of co-ordination, addressing whether it is a new form of governance from two related perspectives. First, to what extent can the method be effectively applied outside the scope of economic policy? Second, will it lead to policy transfer to the EU and hence act only as a transitional mode of governance? Identified at the Lisbon European Council, the method codified practices such as benchmarking, target-setting and peer review developed in the Luxembourg, Cardiff and Cologne processes. The method offers a new approach to governance of the EU as a heterarchical, decentred and dynamic process. It supports and radicalizes the principle of subsidiarity; offers an alternative to the treaty rules on enhanced co-operation; and addresses some of the legitimacy issues inherent in the EU. In EMU, the method arose out of a specific policy framework with a common monetary policy complemented by the coordination of national economic policies. The recent recommendation issued against Ireland is the first example of the operation of the method in EMU and shows how debate can be stimulated and how different and arguably equally valid perspectives defended. The particular experience of EMU with a sound money, sound finance paradigm, a long history of projectbuilding by key elites and the central role of the European Council suggest similar conditions are required for the effective application of the method in other policy spheres. The context within which the method has operated to date is contingent and could change either over time or between policy fields. If so, the very openness of the method may serve to reconfigure the boundaries of competence between the Member States and the Union, after all.

This paper seeks to evaluate and explain the degree of supranational entrepreneurship shown by the European Commission following the global financial crisis. Focusing on the period 2007-2011, it finds that the Commission used its right of initiative and/or mobilised ideas and information to pursue a supranational European Union (EU) economic policy in few cases. These findings are explained with reference to strategic entrepreneurship, that is the Commission's reluctance to support integrationist initiatives unless they stand a chance of success, and by the fact that partisanship took precedence for the EU executive over the pursuit of integration in some cases. The Commission could yet capitalise on the crisis but its actions in this period call for greater attention by scholars to preference formation by supranational actors as well as a reconsideration of what it means for the EU executive to lead.

Can the euro area survive without a more centralized economic policy? What lessons can be drawn from Economic and Monetary Union about new modes of policy-making in the European Union? Have euro area members spoken with one voice on the international stage and what does this mean for the European Union's ambitions to be a global actor in its own right? This book explores these three key questions through an in-depth analysis of euro area governance from the launch of the single currency in 1999 to the sovereign debt crisis of 2010. Drawing insights from the study of European Union politics, comparative political economy and international political economy, it examines: Economic and Monetary Union's break from the Community method of policy-making; the European Central Bank's ambivalence about the pursuit of ever closer union; the Eurogroup's rise and fall as a forum for economic policy coordination; the interplay between national fiscal institutions and the stability and growth pact; the broad economic policy guidelines' failure to apply peer pressure; the European Union's influence within the G20 and the International Monetary Fund at the height of the global financial crisis; euro diplomacy towards China and other rising powers; and current debates about the fate of EMU and the reform of euro area governance in the aftermath of the global financial crisis. The book's conclusions challenge claims that the euro area is in crisis because of its decentralized approach to decision-making alone and the corollary that the euro can be saved only through a further transfer of sovereignty to the supranational level. 1. INTRODUCTION. The organisation of fiscal policy in the euro area has evolved over time along a trial-and-error process, ... improve in good times and deteriorate in bad times. ... GOVERNING THE AGGREGATE FISCAL STANCE. 4.1 The. Available in the National Library of Australia collection. Author: Hodson, Dermot; Format: Book; x, 170 p. : ill. ; 24 cm. pricing of risk or the pricing of a re-denomination risk of euro area bonds during the. European. Keywords: sovereign spreads; fiscal policy; time-varying coefficients. 1 This paper ... governing the amount of time-variation in the unobserved states, is fixed, in each regression, to ... actually be good (bad) news to investors. eBooks Governing The Euro Area In Good Times And Bad is available on PDF,. ePUB and DOC format. You can directly download and save in in to your. 19 Feb 2015. The Treaty expands the scope of decisions on which the euro area. Hodson, D. (2011), Governing the euro area in good times and bad. 31 Jan 2017. Consumer prices in the euro area jump most since early 2013. Amid a push by some German policy makers that it's time to start at least considering. "Rising inflation is bad for consumers, we expect a decline in growth and it. ECB Governing Council member Ewald Nowotny has urged for patience,. 25 May 2017. The Euro area's current "debt restructuring regime". further deep restructuring looks inevitable, this time at the expense of official cr...

The crises that weigh heavily on the European Union (EU) in the 2010s have underlined the continued importance of integration theory, albeit in ways that go beyond classic debates. Postfunctionalism, in particular, has shown how European integration and its problems stand on shifting political cleavages. And yet, postfunctionalist claims that such changes would create a constraining dissensus in the EU rests uneasily with the intensification of European integration since the Maastricht Treaty was signed. This article offers a new intergovernmentalist explanation of this puzzle, which shows how mainstream governing parties have circumvented rather than being constrained by Eurosceptic challenger parties and challenger governments. The result, it contends, is not a constraining but a destructive dissensus that adds to the EU's political disequilibrium. Understanding the persistence of this disequilibrium and its potential to unwind disruptively is a key challenge for contemporary integration theory.