No abstract

Because information technologies are often characterized by network effects, compatibility is an important issue. Although total network value is maximized when everyone operates in one compatible network, we find that the technology benefits for the users depend on vendor incentives, which are driven by the existence of “de facto” or “de jure” standards. In head-to-head competition, customers are better off “letting a thousand flowers bloom,” fostering fierce competition that results in a de facto standard if users prefer compatibility over individual fit, or a split market if fit is more important. In contrast, firms that sponsor these products are better off establishing an up-front, de jure standard to lessen the competitive effects of a network market. However, if a firm is able to enter the market first by choosing a proprietary/incompatible technology, it can use a “divide-and-conquer” strategy to increase its profit compared with head-to-head competition, even when there are no switching costs. When there is a first mover, the early adopters, who are “locked in” because of switching costs, never regret their decision to adopt, whereas the late adopters, who are not subject to switching costs, are exploited by the incumbent firm. In head-to-head competition, customers are unified in their preference for incompatibility when there is a first mover; late adopters prefer de jure compatibility because they bear the brunt of the first-mover advantage. This again underscores the interdependence of user net benefits and vendor strategies.

No abstract

T o meet the growing demand for sustainably produced products, firms must be able to source sustainably produced parts from their suppliers. In this study, we analyze how a buyer (manufacturer or retailer) can use sourcing policies to influence their suppliers to adopt sustainable processes that can meet certain sustainability criteria. We study two sustainable sourcing policies commonly observed in practice, which influence suppliers' process decisions by committing to offer sustainable products. Under a Sustainable Preferred policy, a buyer commits to offering a sustainable product if she can source sustainably produced parts from the supplier, but will otherwise offer a conventional product. In contrast, under a Sustainable Required sourcing policy, a buyer will only offer a sustainable product, and therefore will only source from the supplier if he has adopted a sustainable process. Our results offer insights for managers by identifying how these sustainable sourcing policies influence upstream suppliers to switch to a sustainable process, and how this affects the ability of a downstream buyer to offer a sustainable product. We find that when the buyer sources from a sole supplier, the Preferred policy can deter the supplier from switching as compared to when the buyer remains noncommittal. However, only the Required policy can induce the supplier to switch. In contrast, when a buyer has multiple suppliers, the Preferred policy does not deter the supplier, but can induce him to switch to a sustainable process, similar to the Required policy. Accordingly, our results suggest that to induce the supplier to switch to a sustainable process, a buyer should adopt a Required policy when sourcing from a sole supplier, but utilize a Preferred policy when there are multiple suppliers.

W e study how a commercial firm competes with a free open source product. The market consists of two customer segments with different preferences and is characterized by positive network effects. The commercial firm makes product and pricing decisions to maximize its profit. The open source developers make product decisions to maximize the weighted sum of the segments' consumer surplus, in addition to their intrinsic motivation. The more importance open source developers attach to consumer surplus, the more effort they put into developing software features. Even if consumers do not end up adopting the open source product, it can act as a credible threat to the commercial firm, forcing the firm to lower its prices. If the open source developers' intrinsic motivation is high enough, they will develop software regardless of eventual market dynamics. If the open source product is available first, all participants are better off when the commercial and open source products are compatible. However, if the commercial firm can enter the market first, it can increase its profits and gain market share by being incompatible with its open source competitor, even if customers can later switch at zero cost. This first-mover advantage does not arise because users are "locked in," but because the commercial firm deploys a "divide and conquer" strategy to attract early adopters and exploit late adopters. To capitalize on its first-mover advantage, the commercial firm must increase its development investment to improve its product features.