Post-traumatic stress disorder is currently classified as an anxiety disorder with fear as the predominant emotion. This has led to the development of treatment techniques such as exposure aimed at alleviating fear. This article highlights the need to address other emotional responses, in particular shame and guilt, when assessing and treating PTSD. Hence, it presents two clinical models of shame-based PTSD and guilt-based PTSD. These models are offered as aids to clinicians in assessing and formulating cases of PTSD where shame and guilt are salient issues. The models highlight the importance of assessing meaning in the context of pre-existing schemas and address two pathways to the development of shame and/or guilt: schema congruence and schema incongruence. Several treatment implications are drawn from the models.

Toxin production by C. botulinurn type E was studied in cod, whiting, and flounder filets packaged in air-permeable film, vacuum packages and packages flushed with Nz or CO2 during storage at 8'; 12") or 26'C. Cod and whiting filets were flushed with CO2 and stored continuously at 4'C or cycled between 4" or 8' and 26°C. Cod and whiting fillets were flushed with gas mixtures and stored at 8'C or 26'C. Flounder deteriorated rapidly and was rejected by sensory evaluation prior to toxin detection during vacuum or modified atmosphere storage at 12"C and 8'C but after toxin detection at 26°C. Toxin was present either prior to or simultaneously with sensory rejection of cod and whiting fillets for all vacuum or modified atmosphere treatments and temperature regimens.

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This article seeks to contribute to current person‐centred research exploring post‐traumatic stress disorder (PTSD) and post‐traumatic growth (PTG), by offering a person‐centred political critique of some individualizing/pathologizing ways in which these two discourses seem to be developing. Notions of lower resilience (Regel & Joseph, ), faulty brains (Bell, ), lower intelligence (Bomyea, Risbrough, & Lang, ), faulty femininity (Lilly, Pole, Best, Metzler, & Marmar, ) and personal deficits (Joseph, Murphy, & Regel, ) are identified. Some troubling parallels with the borderline personality disorder (BPD) discourse are drawn. Yet, while the meanings/implications of a BPD diagnosis increasingly attract stringent criticism, current PTSD and PTG research is not being sufficiently challenged from a political perspective. The article argues that person‐centred approaches (PCAs) need to be more recognized as treatments for PTSD – this work is already underway (see Murphy, Archard, Regel, & Joseph, , for instance) – and that, concurrently and then increasingly, practitioners of PCAs must intervene in the PTSD discourse, also challenging themselves to conceptualize what is now termed PTSD as actually just one incongruence amongst many, rather than a psychopathology encountered by some (deficient) people.

Proctor (2002) put it: PCAs can have the "power of individuals within a group of equals, to suggest and be listened to " (p. 37).PCAs could insist that incongruence is actually "universal" (Biermann-Ratjen, 1998, p. 114), that no-one at all is fully-functioning, and that what is currently called PTSD is really one incongruence amongst many, rather than a psychopathology encountered by some (deficient) people who need experts to treat them and make them whole again.Such argumentation would draw clearly upon Rogers' (1978) contentions that people do not need to be "guided, instructed, rewarded, punished and controlled" because they have the tendency to actualise, "to move towards growth" (p. 8), but, given that PCAs have increasingly sought to enter the psychopathology field on its terms rather than personcentred terms, more important to progress in this field is that PCAs themselves become more person-centred, perhaps by revisiting the relevance of existentialism in our work, and by recognising that what some call pathology is merely "an essential reminder of our vibrant and dangerous aliveness" (Deurzen, 2010, p. 238).The paper starts by introducing psychopathology and its relationship with PCAs. A critical analysis of PTSD is then offered. In the UK, the National Institute for Health and Care Excellence (NIHCE), an organisation which gives "national guidance and advice to improve health and social care" (NICHE, 2005, p. 4), currently recommends trauma-focused cognitive behavioural therapy (T-FCBT) and eye movement desensitisation and reprocessing (EMDR) as psychotherapeutic treatments for PTSD; consequently, they are then explored in comparison with PCAs, which are not mentioned by NICE (2005). Murphy et al. (2013) reveal that PCAs are now increasingly available in specialist trauma services in the UK; and Murphy and Joseph (2014) show the efficacy of PCAs with PTSD, declaring the approach a "radical ontology for trauma" (p. 12). This more practice-based material is explored to show that there is an increasingly strong place from which PCAs can intervene into the PTSD conversation in the ways proposed in this paper. Lemma (1996) stated that "psychopathology generally refers to patterns of maladaptive behaviour and states of distress which interfere with some aspect of adaptation" (p. 1), and Joseph and Worsley (2005) wrote that "psychopathology refers to the study of unusual, distressing and dysfunctional psychological conditions" (p. 1). PSYCHOPATHOLOGY AND PTSD: CRITIQUES AND CONNECTIONSNotions of a condition being considered unusual clash with Murphy et al.'s (2013, p. 435) observation that PTSD diagnoses are "increasingly common", and references to maladaptive behaviour obscure how people are much more than one of their perceived behaviours.Furthermore, "diagnostic heterogeneity" (Kroes, Whalley, Rugg & Brewin, 2011, p. 526) needs to be recognised. Curwen and Ruddell (2008) explain that a process of "ruling out" happens, and "when all other diagnoses in the differential diagnosis have been ruled out the

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