Using the 2008 National Politics Study, the present study indicates that while African Americans are more likely than whites to hear sermons about poverty and other political issues, hearing such sermons more consistently associates with support for anti‐poverty government programs among non‐Hispanic whites than among both African Americans and Hispanics. The racially/ethnically marginalized status of blacks and Hispanics may contribute to these groups being more receptive than whites to religious messages emphasizing social inequality. The contrasting racial experiences of dominance and marginalization may also help explain why hearing politicized sermons is more meaningful to the progressive social welfare attitudes of whites than to African Americans and Hispanics. This expectation is rooted in the heightened variability of perspectives among whites and their religious organizations regarding the government's role in aiding the economically disadvantaged. Conversely, the vast majority of blacks and Hispanics support the government helping individuals who fallen upon hard times. The greater variability in opinion among whites may also allow for greater differences in opinion to emerge between whites who attend relative to those outside of religious congregations led by clergy emphasizing spiritual and political solidarity with the poor than is the case for African Americans and Hispanics.

American society and culture that preceded the emergence of the tea party and paved the way for its success, as well as for the rise of Donald Trump. For example, it would be interesting to see whether there was a correlation between areas where the tea party enjoyed its greatest strength at the grassroots in 2009-12 and where Donald Trump enjoyed his greatest success in Republican primaries in 2016.I am also a little skeptical about the utility of the "insurgent factionalism" framework proposed here for understanding intra-party conflict in general. That is because, as Blum acknowledges, there has been nothing quite comparable to the tea party on the Left. Although intra-party ideological conflict is inevitable in a two-party system, and the Democrats certainly have seen their share of that sort of conflict, the left wing has never had the level of influence within the Democratic Party that the Far Right has had within the modern Republican Party.My own hypothesis is that this reflects a fundamental difference between the two parties in the United States. Democrats, including those on the Left, want the government to try to solve social problems by enacting major policy reforms. Republicans, especially on the Right, have no positive agenda other than cutting taxes and reversing policies enacted by Democrats. As a result, left-wing activists and members of Congress may be reluctant to attack their moderate colleagues too harshly out of fear of undermining the party's legislative agenda, especially when Democrats are in power. That hypothesis is about to get a test during the first two years of the Biden administration.Even though the tea party's heyday has passed, Blum's book provides an important and timely perspective on the rise of reactionary conservatism and the influence of rightwing extremism and activism on the modern Republican Party. For anyone who still needs convincing, Blum's book provides plenty of evidence that the tea party movement of 2009-12 paved the way for Donald Trump's takeover of the Republican Party in 2016. Even with Trump out of the White House, his brand of reactionary conservatism is likely to remain a powerful if not dominant influence on the Republican Party in many parts of the United States for a long time.

No abstract

No abstract

Anger in Black and White I Never Thought I'd See the Day: Black Joy in the Good TimesThe sun barely peered through a sea of clouds on this frigid morning in January 2009, overlooking the expanse of people in front of the Capitol steps in Washington, DC. To this day I remember the sensations I felt as I stood in that crowd, frantically shifting my weight from one leg to the other in the vain hope of warming my feet on the cold brown dirt surface along the National Mall. The bitter wintry cold of that day was overwhelmed by the enveloping warmth I felt from the throngs of black folks that had been gathering since before dawn. They proudly displayed their elation at the historical moment that was about to unfold. Older people exclaimed to anyone within earshot that they had thought they would never see this moment in their lifetimes. Younger folks swayed in exuberance, alternating shouts of yes we can! and yes we did! The emotions expressed by the gatherings of jubilant black people on the Mall were palpable. The pride in the sense of collective accomplishment. We really did it. We elected a black president. The surreal sense of joyous disbelief at a long-delayed dream finally realized. Is this really happening? I almost can't believe it. These feelings would undergird black people's longstanding support of Obama long after the honeymoon period would end for white members of Obama's support coalition. 1 These feelings would elevate black participation to new heights. In 2010, the first midterm election of the Obama era, African Americans were the 1 Newport (2014).